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Article developed through a series of conversations (and ultimately
a panel discussion) between six international criminal justice profes-
sionalspracticing attorneys, scholars, and judgesregarding the
nature and effects of plea bargaining (and its comparative substi-
tutes) in their respective countries. Providing a comparative look at
different mechanisms for criminal case resolution, this Article exam-
ines the applicable practices and procedures in the common law
nations of Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, and the
United States.
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INTRODUCTION
Criminal trials hold a prominent place in the Western popular
culture and public imagination. In the United States, the trials
place would undoubtedly be marked by movies such as Presumed
Innocent, To Kill a Mockingbird, and A Lesson Before Dying. Real
life sensational criminal trials, such as those of O.J. Simpson, Casey
Anthony, and Leopold and Loeb, captivated America. In Australia,
those popular films are Breaker Morant and A Cry in the Dark,
while in England it may be Witness for the Prosecution and the vari-
ous Rumpole of the Bailey programs. Canadians viewed An Officer
and a Murderer and Murder Unveiled, and many New Zealanders
certainly bought tickets to see Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Heav-
enly Creatures. Their lists of trials of the century might include
Pauline Parker and Juliet Hulme, Ruth Ellis and Gary Dodson,
Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka, and John Wayne Glover (New
Zealand, England, Canada, and Australia, respectively). Yes, it is
truly a fascination we all seem to have with the criminal trial.
In the real world of criminal justice, though, the trial has increas-
ingly taken a distant back seat to the plea-bargained resolution of
the matter. This Symposium looks at all sorts of issues in the
United States related to such negotiated deals. In this Article, six
experienced criminal justice professionals provide a comparative
view of plea bargaining, laying out what it means in the five
common law nations of Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand,
and the United States.
I. THE ISSUES
Our approach identifies a number of key issues common to our
five countries, with each of us reflecting on our own national
approaches to these matters. Each of us has responded to the
particular issues as laid out by our editor, Professor Marcus, who
has then blended the responses together, as indicated below.
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A. Defining Plea Bargaining
What is meant in your nation by the term plea bargaining?
Each criminal justice professional participating in this project
understands the common U.S. term plea bargaining. As we can
see, however, the prevailing terms in the nations do differ.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: In Australia, plea bargaining
is the informal process by which a prosecuting authority and de-
fense counsel negotiate the charge(s) on which the prosecution will
proceed, and/or concessions that may be made by the prosecution
in relation to sentencing, including the facts on which sentencing
should proceed, with a view to arriving at a mutually acceptable
agreement according to which the defendant will plead guilty.1 It is
not a process in which the court has any formal role.2 The practice
has been recognized in case law, if only to identify its limitations in
affecting the final outcome of criminal proceedings and to delineate
the roles of the parties and the court.3
1. See Asher Flynn, Fortunately We in Victoria Are Not in That UK Situation: Austra-
lian and United Kingdom Legal Perspectives on Plea Bargaining Reform, 16 DEAKIN L. REV.
361, 371 (2011).
2. See MATTHIAS BOLL, PLEA BARGAINING AND AGREEMENT IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: A
COMPARISON BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, ENGLAND AND GERMANY 5 (2009) (ebook) ([I]n Australia
... the prosecutions choice whether to charge a lesser offence does not require the approval
of the court.). In Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501, 534 (Austl.), Gaudron and
Gummow JJ noted, The integrity of the judicial processparticularly, its independence and
impartiality and the public perception thereofwould be compromised if the courts were to
decide or to be in any way concerned with decisions as to who is to be prosecuted and for
what.
3. See, e.g., Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58, 76 (Austl.) (holding that the prose-
cution cannot assist the judge in determining the defendants sentence, and that the
sentencing judge, alone, [is] to decide what sentence will be imposed) (footnote omitted); GAS
v The Queen (2004) 217 CLR 198, 210-11 (Austl.) (distinguishing and categorizing the differ-
ent responsibilities held by the prosecutor, the defendant, and the judge throughout the plea
bargaining process); Maxwell, 184 CLR at 511-514, 534 (holding that, save to prevent an
abuse of process, or where there is evidence that the plea is the result of ignorance, fear,
duress, or mistake on the part of the defendant, a trial judge has no power to review a
prosecutors decision to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser offence, nor to intervene and reject
the plea).
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The label attached to the practice will depend on the jurisdiction.4
The term plea negotiations (leading to plea agreements) is pre-
ferred in some jurisdictions, including Western Australia, because
of the deal making connotations associated with bargaining and
the understanding we have of the formalized system in the United
States.
As the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSW LRC)
explained in a 2013 consultation paper, [m]ost Australian jurisdic-
tions incorporate plea negotiations into prosecutorial practice, and
the practice does not vary widely between jurisdictions.5 I will focus
below on the experience in Western Australia, because I am most
familiar with that jurisdiction.6 However, the general approach and
rationale are common across the jurisdictions, and indeed, as will be
seen below, all jurisdictions are bound by guiding principles
elucidated by the High Court of Australia.7
Plea negotiations in Australia can be part of a structured case
conferencing system managed by a court, but generally they involve
informal discussions and correspondence between the prosecution
and defense.8 They can occur at any time before the trial of the char-
ges brought against a defendant, and even after a trial has commen-
ced.9 It may be, for instance, that the course of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution during a trial gives rise to a reconsideration of
4. There are nine legal jurisdictions, each of which has its own legislation and
prosecuting authority: the Commonwealth, six states, and two territories. Terms used include
charge bargaining, plea negotiations, and the very neutral pre-trial discussions.
5. N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMMN, ENCOURAGING APPROPRIATE EARLY GUILTY PLEAS:
MODELS FOR DISCUSSION ¶ 4.25 (2013), http://www.lawreform.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev
7wr/_assets/lrc/m73165113/cp15_encouraging%20appropriate%20early%20guilty%20pleas
_models%20for%20discussion_nsw%20law%20reform% [https://perma.cc/F56E-535K] [here-
inafter NSW LRC]. At the time of writing, the Commission had not published a final report.
6. In this regard I acknowledge the very helpful contribution of my colleague, Amanda
Forrester, Consultant State Prosecutor, which I have incorporated.
7. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
8. See Vicki Waye & Paul Marcus, Australia and the United States: Two Common
Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, Part 2, 18 TUL. J. INTL & COMP. L. 335, 349
(2010). Even when it is part of structured case conferencing, the court facilitates the process
but has no role in the negotiations.
9. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS FOR N.S.W., PROSECUTION GUIDELINES
OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FOR NEW SOUTH WALES 37 (2007),
http://www.6windeyer.com/au/downloads/DPP_Proseuction_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/
76AD-DPXS] [hereinafter NSW GUIDELINES] (Negotiations between the parties are to be
encouraged and may occur at any stage of the progress of a matter through the courts.).
1154 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1147
the prospects of conviction on the charge being tried. This may
prompt discussion about acceptance of a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense of which the defendant could be convicted on the indictment.
If such a plea were entered and accepted by the prosecution, the
jury would be discharged without being required to return a ver-
dict.10
In all Australian jurisdictions, however, plea negotiations are
encouraged, and sometimes mandated, to occur at an early stage in
the management of a case.11 The purpose of negotiations is to ex-
plore whether the case can be resolved without trial, and the sooner
that happens in the conduct of the case, the greater the benefits to
the defendant, any victim, and the State, if agreement is reached.12
The process can be instigated by either the prosecution or the
defense.13 Generally, if an offer has not been forthcoming from the
defense, it is part of the prosecutors case management responsibili-
ties to inquire whether the defendant intends to plead guilty to any
offense.14 It is an aspect of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
which, in the context of prosecutions in the superior courts,15 is first
applied in deciding whether to indict for the offense(s) charged by
10. See Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 107 (Austl.).
11. As the NSW LRC states, a plea agreement is an early resolution mechanism. NSW
LRC, supra note 5, ¶ 4.1.
12. See Waye & Marcus, supra note 8, at 353 (noting that plea bargaining performs an
important utilitarian function in Australia by saving costs and protecting victims from
stress).
13. See GORDON SAMUELS, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS FOR N.S.W.,REVIEW
OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR
CHARGE BARGAINING AND TENDERING OF AGREED FACTS ¶ 9.1 (2002), http://www.lawlink.nsw.
gov.au/report/lpd_reports.nsf/files/Report%201.PDF/$FILE/Report%201.PDF [https://perma.
cc/7YLX-F7W7]. (Note: The reference in the review to Commonwealth and Queensland
policies against a prosecutor initiating negotiations is no longer applicable. Changes in those
policies have removed the prohibition. The Commonwealth guidelines specifically allow the
prosecution to initiate negotiations.).
14. See Flynn, supra note 1, at 375 (Prosecutorial Discretion Policy 2 encourages them
to initiate discussions with the defence practitioner, regardless of whether the defence
approaches them.).
15. The Superior Courts are the Supreme Court, the District (or County) Court of each
State and Territory, and the Federal Court in the Commonwealth jurisdiction. Plea
negotiations also occur in courts of summary jurisdiction (Magistrates and Local courts) in
respect of non-indictable offenses or either way offenses that remain in the summary court.
Generally, there is less case management involved in that jurisdiction, and prosecutors often
will not have a brief until a short time before a hearing. Consequently, any plea negotiation
is more likely to be instigated by the defense.
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the police, or for some other offense(s), or, indeed, for any offense at
all.16 Generally the prosecutor will indict for the offense that best
reflects the criminality of the alleged conduct, as disclosed by the
available evidence, and for which there are reasonable prospects of
conviction.17 There are other public interest considerations that
may affect the decision.18 Even where there are reasonable prospects
of conviction, there remains scope to consider the strength of the
case and other pragmatic considerations to determine whether the
State should accept a plea to a lesser offense.19 The assessment can
be attended with considerable complexity, particularly in cases in-
volving multiple defendants, where the relative strength of the case
against each defendant and their relative culpability and prepared-
ness to assist the authorities will have a bearing on any plea
negotiations.20
If there is a prospect that the accused would plead guilty to a
lesser offense, or to some of the offenses originally charged, the
question is whether a conviction for the lesser offense, or lesser
number of offenses, would adequately reflect the defendants crim-
inality and serve the public interest, while giving regard to the
benefits of resolving a prosecution without trial.21 In many cases the
answer will be in the negative, and there will be no scope for reduc-
ing the charge or the number of charges. It may be, however, that
in those cases the defendant would be prepared to plead guilty if the
prosecution makes certain factual concessions which tend to reduce
the seriousness of the alleged offense, or if the prosecution agrees to
16. See MICHAEL ROZENES, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN AUSTRALIA TODAY 3 (2004),
http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/prosecuting/rozenes.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J8MY-KW42]. The general course of prosecution from charging by an investigating authority
to resolution is discussed later. See infra Part I.I.
17. See DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS FOR W. AUSTL., STATEMENT OF PROSECUTION POLICY
AND GUIDELINES 2005 ¶ 75 (2005), http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/_files/statement_prosecution_
policy2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/E778-MGUX].
18. See id. ¶¶ 23-33, 58 (describing the many different public interest factors that should
be considered to determine whether a prosecutor should proceed with a case).
19. See id. ¶ 75 (noting that a prosecutor may agree to discontinue a charge ... where the
evidence available to support the State may be weak).
20. See id. ¶ 31 (listing the many factors that should go into a prosecutors decision to
enter plea negotiations with a defendant).
21. See id. ¶¶ 73-75 (noting that a plea bargain can benefit the accused person and the
community, but such a plea should be accepted only if it reasonably reflects the essential
criminality of the conduct and provides an adequate basis for sentencing).
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make a submission that a particular sentencing option is open or
that the offense falls within a certain level on the scale of serious-
ness for such offense. Of course, a plea agreement may involve any
combination of the above considerations, and will usually include an
agreed statement of the facts on which the court will be asked to
sentence.22
In relation to factual and sentencing concessions, care is taken
not to engage in a bargain, whereby the State might be seen to be
offering a concession to induce a plea of guilty. The State may be
asked to indicate its position on sentencing in the event that the de-
fendant was to plead guilty. Ordinarily, such an indication would
not be given in the absence of all relevant sentencing materials.
Moreover, it should be no more than an indication of the States
submission consistent with principle and precedent, having regard
for the agreed facts and giving weight to the mitigating value of the
plea of guilty and any assistance the defendant may have provided
to the authorities.23 It will not bind the sentencing judge.
In some jurisdictions, the indication of the prosecutions sentenc-
ing submission is regarded as part of the plea agreement, and there
was a practice (considered to be consistent in Victoria with decisions
of the Court of Appeal in that state) whereby the prosecution would
make a submission to the court not only about the type of sentence,
but about the appropriate range or quantum of imprisonment,
where imprisonment was appropriate.24 That practice now appears
to be prohibited by the High Court decision of Barbaro v The
Queen.25 In Barbaro, the justices held that the practice was wrong
22. See NSW GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 38 (noting that a negotiated and agreed-upon
set of facts may be prepared by the prosecution and defense during plea negotiations).
23. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS FOR W. AUSTL., JOINT PROTOCOL
BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS AND THE LAW SOCIETY OF
WESTERN AUSTRALIA REGARDING CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH LETTERS OF RECOGNITION WILL
BE MADE AVAILABLE TO DEFENCE COUNSEL ¶¶ 7-8 (2011), http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/_files/
Recognition_Protocol_ODPP_LawSociety.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3MU-UFNE]. Occasionally,
a decision may be made not to pursue a prosecution against a defendant who has provided
significant assistance to an investigating authority, but such assistance is more often dealt
with as a sentencing consideration, with the authority providing the court with a letter
recognizing the assistance (known as a letter of comfort or letter of recognition). See id. ¶¶
7-9.
24. See R v MacNeill-Brown [2008] VSCA 190 ¶¶ 58-59 (Austl.).
25. (2014) 253 CLR 58, 76 (Austl.).
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in principle and should cease, as it is for the sentencing judge alone
to decide what sentence to impose.26
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: In Canada, we tend to use the
term resolution discussions.27
In Canada, all criminal matters are subject to statutorily
mandated judicial pretrial discussions, where Crown and defense
counsel meet with a judge.28 The pretrial judge is disqualified to
serve as the trial judge.29 At the meeting, there is to be discussion
of the issues at the trial, to determine how much time is required for
the litigation.30 In addition, it is contemplated that the presiding
judge might express his or her views on the merits of issues, in an
effort to streamline the case and restrict issues to those that are
genuinely deserving of a hearing.31
Superimposed on this process, many judges also engage in the
practice of discussing resolution of the charges.32 Within Canada,
there is a difference of opinion amongst the judiciary as to how far
judges ought to go with this process.33 There are a variety of
26. See id. One commentator has suggested the decision will undermine the fairness and
effectiveness of the sentencing process, and that [l]egislation is desirable and necessary to
negate the impact of the decision. Mirko Bagaric, Editorial, The Need for Legislative Action
to Negate the Impact of Barbaro v The Queen, 38 CRIM. L.J. 133, 133 (2014). The ramifications
of the decision have been considered recently by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Matthews
v The Queen [2014] VSCA 291 ¶ 29 (Austl.).
27. See MILICA POTREBIC PICCINATO, DEPT OF JUSTICE OF CAN., PLEA BARGAINING 1
(2004), https://perma.cc/7JWC-ZLHT (noting that in Canada there was a movement away
from the use of the term plea bargaining and toward more neutral expressions such as ...
resolution discussions).
28. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 625.1 (Can.).
29. See PICCINATO, supra note 27, at 10 (It should be noted that the pre-trial conference
judge will not preside over subsequent substantive courtroom proceedings related to the mat-
ter without the consent of both parties.).
30. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 625.1 (Can.).
31. See id.
32. See PICCINATO, supra note 27, at 10 (As a neutral guide, the judge may also be of
great assistance in helping the parties identify their differences, and, where appropriate,
reconcile them.).
33. See PUB. PROSECUTION SERV. OF CAN., PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE OF CANADA
DESKBOOK: § 3.7 RESOLUTION DISCUSSIONS, at 12-13 (2014), http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/
pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/d-g-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FU6-GZA7] [hereinafter PPSC DESK-
BOOK] (A system of judicially-supervised pre-trials exists in most jurisdictions, although the
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approaches, ranging from disinclination to active participation.34
Generally, judicial pretrial discussions are structured by forms, pro-
cedures, and practice memoranda issued by the courts.35
Although there are differences of opinion, experience would
suggest that discussion of resolution with counsel can achieve
appropriate results that are consistent with the interests of justice.
In some jurisdictions, pretrial judges are encouraged to express
candid and blunt views. It is by testing the limits of each partys
position that a satisfactory resolution is often reached.
It is important to stress that judges do not encourage pleas of
guilt and/or particular sentences purely for the sake of efficiency.
To the contrary, the sentence must be one that is fit in all of the
circumstances.36 But several factors come into play. Consider a case
where the offender has a viable constitutional argument, which
could result in exclusion of the prosecutions evidence. In this in-
stance, a plea of guilt is indicative of significant remorse. The
Crown, facing the prospect of losing its evidence, may well agree to
a lesser sentence on a plea. This is an appropriate sentencing dis-
count based on a recognized mitigating factor.
In other instances, a plea and agreed-upon sentence serve other
interests, such as sparing a vulnerable victim the additional trauma
of testifying in court.37 In many resolution discussions, counsel agree
on a joint position to be put forward to the court.38
form may differ from one jurisdiction to the next.).
34. See PICCINATO, supra note 27, at 9 (describing various degrees of judicial involvement
in resolution discussions).
35. For example, in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, pretrial conferences are gov-
erned by section 625.1 of the Criminal Code, see R.S. 2002, c 13, s 50 (Can.), and the Criminal
Proceedings Rules: subrules 28.04(1)-(3), (5), (6), and (8). Form 17, the Pre-trial Conference
Report, is to be filled out and filed by both Crown and defense counsel prior to the pretrial
conference. Id. at s 28.04(2).
36. See PPSC DESKBOOK, supra note 33, at 6 (Fairness also means that the Crown should
honour all negotiated plea or sentence agreements unless fulfilling the agreement would
clearly be contrary to the public interest.) (footnote omitted).
37. See PICCINATO, supra note 27, at 9 (noting that victims may also benefit from
resolution discussions because it will relieve them from the burden of having to testify in
open court).
38. See id. at 2 (noting that sentence discussions will allow the prosecutor and defense
counsel to make a joint recommendation for a range of sentences that can be submitted to the
court).
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In Canada, there is a test to be applied by a judge before rejecting
a joint position on a sentence put forward by experienced counsel.
Such a position is to be rejected only where the court is satisfied
that the proposed sentence is disproportionately lenient, or would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.39 Only in these
exceptional circumstances is a judge entitled to jump a joint
submission, imposing a higher sentence than that endorsed by
counsel.40
Of course, resolution discussions also take place without a judicial
participant serving as referee.41 Sometimes, by the time of the judi-
cial pretrial discussion, counsel have already reached an agreement
through independent discussions.42
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: There is no formal pro-
cess for plea negotiation in England and Wales.43 In general, prose-
cutors are not allowed to address the court on issues of sentence,
which remain entirely within the courts discretion.44 In all but the
most minor cases, however, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
selects the charge, which allows conversations to take place between
counsel.45 Negotiations with the defense are conducted by the CPS
39. Id. at 8 (citing R. v. Dorsey (1999), 123 O.A.C. 3d 342 (Can. Ont. C.A.)).
40. See id. (noting that judges are legally obligated not to reject a joint submission, but
that the sentence that will be ultimately imposed is entirely within the [judges] discretion).
41. See id. at 9 (recognizing that [m]ost resolution discussions occur solely between the
prosecutor and defence counsel).
42. See id. (recognizing that counsel are required to notify the court if an agreement has
been reached before the beginning of trial).
43. See Stephen Hockman, A New Framework for Plea Negotiation in Fraud Cases, BAR-
RISTERMAG., http:/www.barristermagazine.com/barrister/index.php?id=186 [https://perma.cc/
7KRH-SYFC] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (noting that there is at present no formal procedure
for plea negotiation in England).
44. See John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation in
England, 13 LAW & SOCY REV. 287, 288 (1979) (Indeed, one of the central features of the
English judicial system is the extent to which trial judges have been able to retain their
sentencing discretion.).
45. CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., THE DIRECTORS GUIDANCE ON CHARGING: GUIDANCE TO
POLICE OFFICERS AND CROWN PROSECUTORS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSE-
CUTIONS UNDER S37A OF THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984 § 2, at 1 (3d ed. 2007),
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/dpp_guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3SN-N2CF]
(noting that Crown Prosecutors will determine whether a person is to be charged).
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or a barrister representing them.46 But any agreement to accept a
plea to a lesser charge cannot provide a high degree of certainty of
what sentence is likely to be imposed.47 Also, many judges think
they have the power to disallow a plea of guilt not compatible with
the alleged facts.48
Plea discussions between prosecution and defense before trial
have taken place for many years.49 Being informal in nature, they
take place in private and go unrecorded.50 Such discussions inevit-
ably occur at a late stage in the process after a defendant has been
charged, following what might have been an extremely lengthy
investigation. When the defense changes its plea on the day of the
trial, the trial goes crackedthe late plea means that the case will
not be heard, and so another case has to be moved up the court list.
This can lead to chaos, as counsel for the next case may be engaged
elsewhere, witnesses not called, and so on.51 Hence, there is pres-
sure to enter a plea earlierfor example, in pretrial hearings.
A judge may give an indication as to the maximum sentence on
a guilty plea but only if the defense asks for such an indication;52
the court retains an unfettered discretion to refuse to give it or to
46. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 211 (2002) (When
the Crown Prosecution Service has taken over, a further discussion of the charges can occur
between the accused and the Crown prosecutor.).
47. See Baldwin & McConville, supra note 44, at 288 (noting that it [is] difficult for the
prosecution to offer the defence any promise with respect to the sentence because offenses
in England do not carry fixed sentences and are at the judges discretion).
48. For example, in R v. Sutcliffe (1981), the famous case of the Yorkshire Ripper, the
judge refused to accept a plea of guilty to manslaughter by way of diminished responsibility,
despite prosecution willingness to do so and despite unanimous psychiatric opinions. See GARY
SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 422 (15th ed. 2014).
49. See Monty Raphael, Joint Head of Fraud and Regulatory, Peters & Peters, Conference
Presentation at the European Criminal Bar Association Autumn Conference: Plea Bargaining
and the Role of the Lawyer 1 (Oct. 4, 2008), http://www.petersandpeters.com/sites/default/
files/publications/pmrPleaBargainingandtheroleofthelawyer_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WTN-
TZX7] (It has long been the case in the UK that informal negotiations take place.).
50. See id. (noting that plea discussions are often held in private between defence lawyers
and prosecutors).
51. See Peter W. Tague, Guilty Pleas or Trials: Which Does the Barrister Prefer?, 32 MELB.
U. L. REV. 242, 246 (2008) (Cracked trials are reviled for wasting expensive preparation by
judges, and by the prosecution and defence, as well as for inconveniencing witnesses.).
52. See R v. Goodyear [2005] EWCA (Crim) 888 [51] ([C]ounsel is entitled to advise the
defendant that an advance indication of [the maximum] sentence may be sought from [the
judge].).
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postpone giving it.53 But once given, it is binding on any judge who
tries the case.54
To encourage plea discussions in serious and complex fraud cases
to take place earlier, the Attorney General has issued guidelines
intended to offer a formal, transparent framework to facilitate such
negotiations to take place.55 The Fraud Review saw such guidelines
as more an evolutionary change than a revolutionary one.56 Once
an agreement has been reached as to the pleas, discussion as to the
sentence will follow with a joint submission being presented to the
court.57 The court has absolute discretion as to whether it sentences
in accordance with the agreed joint submission.58 It is not essential
that the defendant be legally represented,59 though in a serious case
that is likely (subject to recent changes to legal aid that are causing
no end of problems, including barristers going on strike just when
some notorious, serious frauds are about to come to court). The new
guidelines give prosecutors a new role as to sentence in the sense of
drawing up a joint recommendation to the court, but they have noth-
ing to offer by way of discounts, immunity, or other incentives.60
* * *
53. See id. at [54] (recognizing that the judge may give an indication as to the maximum
sentence of a guilty plea, but that there are certain factors that may stop him from doing so).
54. See id. at [61] (Once an indication has been given, it is binding and remains binding
on the judge who has given it, and it also binds any other judge who becomes responsible for
the case.).
55. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, FRAUD REVIEW, FINAL REPORT 242-43 (2006), http://
northeastfraudforum.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/fraudreview.pdf [https://perma.cc/
26KZ-Z4EF].
56. Id. at 251.
57. See ATTORNEYGEN.SOFFICE, ATTORNEY GENERALS GUIDELINES ON PLEADISCUSSIONS
IN CASES OF SERIOUS OR COMPLEX FRAUD ¶ D9 (2009), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/plea-
discussions-in-cases-of-serious-or-complex-fraud--8 [https://perma.cc/S455-JKBJ] (Where
agreement is reached as to pleas, the parties should discuss the appropriate sentence with a
view to presenting a joint written submission to the court.).
58. See id. ¶ D10 (noting that [t]he prosecutor should bear in mind all of the powers of
the court upon presenting the joint submission).
59. See id. ¶ C1 (noting that [t]he prosecutor will not initiate plea discussion with a
defendant who is not legally represented, but that a non-represented defendant may
approach the prosecutor to initiate the discussion).
60. Nowhere in the Attorney Generals guidelines, for instance, are Crown prosecutors
permitted to grant immunity. See id.
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New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: We do not use the term plea-
bargaining in any official or unofficial sense. Rather, counsel may
ask the judge for a sentence indication.61 The practice grew up
informally and was the subject of a few cases that refined the
process, but it has now been incorporated into the Criminal Pro-
cedure Act 2011.62 The sentence indication process functions within
the wider process and procedures set down by the Act.
The background to the legislation is that it was enacted to
streamline court procedures and make them more efficient. For that
purpose, there are a number of time limits and time frames set for
various steps in the process, and these steps interlink with other
legislative requirements, primarily the Criminal Disclosure Act,
which sets out the obligations of a prosecutor to make disclosure to
the defense.63
There are three major stages to the process. The first stage is
generally described as administration, or the steps that are taken
to bring a case to a point where it can be considered ready for trial.64
There are certain timeframes within this administration process;
ideally, after a first appearance, the case should be adjourned for
either ten or fifteen working days depending upon the type of case
and the nature of the disclosure to be made.65 At a second appear-
ance, a plea is required together with an election of jury trial if ap-
propriate.66
The matter then goes to a case review hearing, which should
occur at a maximum of forty-five working days after the second
appearance.67 At the case review hearing, a judge may give direc-
tions regarding the management of the case to facilitate resolution
of the interests of justice.68 At this hearing, a case management
memorandum is filed, setting out information about the progress of
61. Criminal Procedure Act 2011, pt 1 s 60 (N.Z).
62. See id. pt 1 ss 60-65.
63. See Criminal Disclosure Act 2008 (N.Z.).
64. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011: OVERVIEW OF THE NEW
PROCESS 1 (2013), http://www.justice.govt.nz/services/service-providers/information-for-legal-
professionals/documents/cpai-infosheets/infosheet-2-criminal-procedure-process-overview
[https://perma.cc/L3PY-U4V8].
65. Criminal Procedure Rules 2012, s 4.1 (N.Z.).
66. Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 51.1 (N.Z.).
67. Criminal Procedure Rules 2012, s 4.2(a) (N.Z.).
68. Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 55 (N.Z.).
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the case and what may be required, whether there are any pretrial
hearings or evidence challenges, difficulties with witnesses, diffi-
culties with dates, and so on.69 This memorandum is prepared after
consultation between the prosecution and defense.
The trial itself marks the third stage. It is generally at the case
review hearing that a sentence indication may be sought, although
a sentence indication may also be sought at the second appearance.
Once a sentence indication has been sought, a date for the hearing
of the sentence indication is set.70 For this purpose, the clock stops.
If a sentence indication is set at the second appearance, the forty-
five working day requirement to a case review hearing is suspended
until the sentence indication process has been completed.71 If a sen-
tence indication is sought at the case review hearing under normal
circumstances, the next important hearing would be the trial call-
over, which is meant to be forty working days after the case review
hearing.72 Once again, that process is sometimes suspended until
the sentence indication has been completed.73
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: There is no formal definition of plea
bargaining in the United States.74 Plea bargaining can take place
69. See id. s 55-56.
70. See id. s 62.
71. There is nothing in the Act or Rules that states that the forty-five working day
requirement is suspended pending a sentence indication. However, under section 54 of the
Act, a matter is sent to case review only once a defendant pleads not guilty. Criminal Proce-
dure Act 2011, s 54 (N.Z.). If no plea is entered pending sentence indication, then the forty-five
day rule also remains pending.
72. Timeframes, N.Z. MINISTRY JUST. (June 2013), http://www.justice.govt.nz/services/
service-providers/information-for-legal-professionals/criminal-court-processes/timeframes
[https://perma.cc/SC8W-9LRM].
73. The Act and Rules do not expressly provide for this suspension of time. However,
section 58 of the Act allows a judge to make any other directions in relation to the
management of the case to facilitate resolution of the proceedings. See Criminal Procedure
Act 2011, s 58 (N.Z.). Similarly, Criminal Procedure Rule 1.7 allows a judge to extend a time
for doing anything in a proceeding. Criminal Procedure Rules 2012, s 1.7 (N.Z.). Either of
these provisions could allow a judge to put a trial callover on hold pending a sentence review,
even though not expressly provided.
74. Plea bargaining practices vary greatly from state to state in the United States
depending upon numerous factors, including the governing laws of the particular state, the
amount and type of funding available to prosecutors and defense counsel, and the number and
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any time prior to the beginning of a trial. Plea bargaining could
even happen during trial, but that is extremely rare given the con-
stitutional and policy considerations involved. It can involve
negotiations on any aspect of the case, including what charges will
be brought, what facts will be included in the agreement, and what
sentence will be requested. All negotiations occur directly between
the parties without any mediator or neutral overseer because the
judge hearing the case is prohibited from becoming involved in plea
negotiations.75
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs all
federal plea proceedings and is also the rule prohibiting a judges
involvement in plea proceedings.76 Under the Rule, a defendant may
plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere.77
Plea negotiations, however, may begin long before Rule 11 comes
into play. In some cases, the prosecution may reach out to the per-
son who is a target of its investigation before any charges are filed
and offer the target a potential benefit in exchange for the targets
cooperation against others. The prosecution may want the target to
provide names or other information about a larger crime or may
want the target to wear a wire or to record phone calls. Or, the pro-
secution may want to know if the target would be willing to actively
seek out other persons to become involved in a sting operation.
Sometimes it is the defense that initiates negotiations. Highlight-
ing the potential benefit of cooperation, this affirmative attempt to
come to an agreement with the government is often called the race
type of crimes charged, among others. For purposes of this discussion, therefore, I will focus
mainly on the practices and rules governing federal plea bargaining. Of course, even in federal
court, practices vary some from district to district, but the governing rules and policies are
basically the same.
75. For a sharp rebuke of a trial judges involvement in the plea negotiation process, see
United States v. Hemphill, 748 F.3d 666, 672 (5th Cir. 2014) (indicating an absolute prohib-
ition on all forms of judicial participation in or interference with the plea negotiation process
and observing that this blanket prohibition admits of no exceptions and serves several
important concerns (quoting United States v. Pena, 720 F.3d 561, 570 (5th Cir. 2013) and
citing United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d 1135, 1139 (5th Cir. 1993))).
76. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
77. Id. Although rare, pleas of nolo contendere do usually involve negotiation. A nolo
contendere plea, which literally translates as no contest, has become something of a rarity,
although it is still sometimes requested in corporate cases because it allows a court to find the
defendant guilty without risk that the plea itself can later be used against the defendant in
a civil suit.
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to the courthouse, meaning whoever gets there first is likely to
benefit the most.78 Unfortunately, it can be the more culpable de-
fendants who receive the most significant benefits and the lowest
sentences. Because lower level and generally poor defendants usu-
ally have little useful information, they may end up receiving longer
sentences than those higher up the chain.79
Benefits can take many forms. Occasionally, there will be an
agreement not to charge at all or to dismiss all charges. More often,
the prosecution will agree to limit the number and type of charges
brought or to dismiss certain counts. The U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission Guidelines Manual must be referenced and the defendants
actual sentencing guidelines must be accurately calculated in every
federal case.80 Moreover, the Guidelines group together offenses and
amounts whether they are charged or not.81 Thus, dismissal of
counts may not be meaningful unless some charges require the im-
position of mandatory minimum sentences (which many federal and
state crimes do) or unless the agreed-upon new charges carry
extremely low maximum sentences as compared to the original
charges. An example would be an agreement to dismiss a drug
distribution count carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years, and to replace it with a charge of using a communication
facility to further a drug crime, which carries a maximum sentence
of four years and the possibility of probation. Charge bargains may
also involve the dismissal of particular charges that carry manda-
78. See Todd A. Berger, After Frye and Lafler: The Constitutional Right to Defense Coun-
sel Who Plea Bargains, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 121, 138-39 (2014) (discussing the numerous
benefits defendants may gain through the plea bargaining process).
79. This still all-too-common result was criticized by Judge Easterbrook more than twenty
years ago in United States v. Brigham:
Mandatory minimum penalties, combined with a power to grant exceptions, cre-
ate a prospect of inverted sentencing. The more serious the defendants crimes,
the lower the sentence .... Discounts for the top dogs have the virtue of necessity,
because rewards for assistance are essential to the business of detecting and
punishing crime. But what makes the post-discount sentencing structure topsy-
turvy is the mandatory minimum, binding only for the hangers on. What is to
be said for such terms, which can visit draconian penalties on the small fry
without increasing prosecutors ability to wring information from their bosses?
977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(i) (2012).
81. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMMN 2014).
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tory consequences in other forums, such as charges that count as
crimes of moral turpitude in immigration proceedings.
Negotiating the sentence is also possible. For example, the prose-
cution can agree to a particular sentence, to a particular guideline
range,or to a percentage of a sentence. Or, it can agree not to oppose
the sentence requested by the defense. The government, however,
cannot restrict victims from making recommendations under the
broad victims rights statute.82
The parties may agree to a specific sentence or to use a particular
section of the Guidelines. Unlike most plea agreements, which allow
courts to impose sentences other than what is recommended in the
agreement, such an agreement binds the sentencing court once the
court accepts the agreement.83
In exchange for any of these benefits, prosecutors in many federal
districts require waivers from the defendant.84 These can range from
broad waivers requiring the defendant to waive all sentencing is-
sues on appeal and through collateral attack, to narrow waivers of
the right to appeal a specific issue agreed to in the plea agreement.85
Although the use of waivers has been approved by every appellate
court to rule on the practice, waivers raise many constitutional and
ethical questions that have not yet been considered by the Supreme
Court.86 The prosecutions requested waiver of the right to collater-
ally attack the effective assistance of counsel has caused so much
controversy that the Attorney Generals Office recently released a
memorandum prohibiting prosecutors from requesting effective
assistance of counsel waivers.87 Such requests are particularly ironic
82. See id. § 6A1.5.
83. The parties can also agree to a conditional plea under which the defendant is allowed
to plead guilty and still preserve the right to appeal specified pretrial issues, such as a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure issue litigated in a motion to suppress or a pretrial motion
challenging the sufficiency of the indictment. Under the rules, both the government and the
court must consent to such a plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
84. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions to Plea Negotiations: Voluntary
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 23 CRIM. JUST. 14 (2008).
85. See id. at 15.
86. For a thorough discussion of these questions, see generally Susan R. Klein et al.,
Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM.CRIM.
L. REV. 73 (2015). For a list of cases approving appellate waivers, see United States v.
Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560-61 (3d Cir. 2001).
87. See Press Release, U.S. Dept of Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces New
Policy to Enhance Justice Departments Commitment to Support Defendants Right to
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in light of the Supreme Courts recent decisions in Padilla v. Ken-
tucky,88 Lafler v. Cooper,89 and Missouri v. Frye,90 which explicitly
held that defendants are constitutionally entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel during plea negotiations.
B. Frequency of Use
How often is plea bargaining used?
For this question, we attempted to determine the actual use of
plea negotiations in the five nations. It was not so surprising to see
the very high numbers for the United States, as these have been
discussed and debated for a long time. What was truly striking,
however, was that we were unable to find any reliable numbers for
most of the other nations, even when we know the practice is wide-
spread.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: I am not aware of any relevant
statistics in Australia,91 but I can confidently say the practice is
used frequently. Its prevalence is recognized by the NSW LRC in its
2013 consultation paper CP 1592 and has been referred to in pre-
vious studies.93 It is an essential part of the role of a prosecutor to
Counsel (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-announces-
new-policy-enhance-justice-departments-commitment-suppoet [https://perma.cc/8HU2-P4BW].
88. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
89. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
90. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
91. It would be difficult to collate such statistics, given the informal nature of the process
and likely variations in record-keeping systems.
92. See NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶ 1.6.
93. See, e.g., Asher Leigh Gevaux Flynn, Secret Deals & Bargained Justice: Lifting the
Veil of Secrecy Surrounding Plea Bargaining in Victoria 27 (Aug. 26, 2009) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University), http://arrow.monash.edu/au/vital/access/manager/
Repository/monash:29437 [https://perma.cc/G4V8-YVZ9]. Dr. Flynn has since published sever-
al articles concerning plea bargaining. See Dr. Asher Flynn: Refereed Journal Articles,
MONASH UNIV., http://profiles.arts.monash.edu.au/asher-flynn-refereed-journal-articles
[https://perma.cc/E3Q2-79KN]. For an interesting comparison of the role of plea bargaining
in Australia and in other countries, see generally OLE KRAMP, HOW TO DEAL WITH THE DEALS:
THE ROLE OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AUSTRALIA AND GERMANYA COMPARISON (2008) (ebook).
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identify matters where it is appropriate to have discussions with the
defendants legal representatives with a view to resolving the mat-
ter without trial, as discussed above.
It remains to be seen whether the decision in Barbaro v The
Queen will affect the frequency of plea negotiations in those juris-
dictions where the prosecution had previously made submissions
about the appropriate sentencing range as part of a plea agree-
ment.94
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: Recognized as an integral el-
ement of the Canadian criminal process,95 plea bargaining has
gained wide acceptance in Canada. Precise and current numbers
are difficult to find, but it appears that a strong majority of criminal
prosecutions are resolved by pleas.96 Again, this will vary from prov-
ince to province. I do not have any definitive statistics to offer. We
undoubtedly have statistics that speak to the prevalence of guilty
pleas as opposed to trials. However, there is no way of knowing the
extent to which those cases were the product of formal resolution
discussions.
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: There are few statistics
as such,97 though some assert that the number of guilty pleas has
94. (2014) 253 CLR 58.
95. R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206, 208 (Can.).
96. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendants Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 973-74 (1983) (suggesting
that, based on a survey of available studies, approximately 70 percent of successful
prosecutions in Canada are disposed of by guilty pleas); Simon N. Verdun-Jones & F.
Douglas Cousineau, Critical Analysis of Plea Bargaining in Canada, in CANADIAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 177, 187 (Craig L. Boydell & Ingrid Arnet Connidis eds., 1982) (requesting
additional studies concerning the frequency of plea bargaining).
97. Recent reports indicate that the vast majority of criminal cases in at least some of the
courts in England and Wales are resolved by plea bargaining. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2013: ENGLAND AND WALES 13 (2014), https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/312021/criminal-justice-statistics-
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MP7-KQ8Y].
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increased in recent years.98 But the Crown Court caseload, far from
decreasing, has significantly increased.99 One U.S. scholar studying
the situation in England and Wales observed that the number of
guilty pleas considered for sentencing in the Crown Court rose
sharply between 1974 and 1988, but then fell back by 2002.100 He of-
fered no explanation of the recent reduction, but a combination of
diversionary measures and discontinuances might hold the key.101
* * *
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: Neither I nor Professor Marcus
was able to locate good data as to the number of cases resolved by
guilty plea, though it is surely large and getting larger.102
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: Today, an overwhelming number of
criminal prosecutions in our country are resolved by guilty pleas.
Plea bargaining occurs in the vast majority of those cases in both
state and federal courts. Indeed, it has been reported that in most
U.S. jurisdictions, plea bargaining occurs more than 90 percent of
the time.103
98. It has been estimated that 70 percent of all Crown cases are resolved by way of plea
bargain. MINISTRYOF JUSTICE,JUDICIAL ANDCOURTSTATISTICS 2011, at 9 (2012), https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217494/judicial-court-stats-
2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N45-T6A5].
99. The Crown Courts trial caseload increased 4.5 percent from 2005 to 2007, with further
increases expected. NATL AUDIT OFFICE, HM COURTS SERV., ADMINISTRATION OF THE CROWN
COURT 10 (2009), http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/0809290.pdf [https://
perma.cc/26QB-AQXM].
100. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Disappearing Trials? A Comparative Perspective, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 735, 747-48 (2004).
101. Id.
102. Indeed, our research efforts turned up an Official Information Act request to the
Ministry of Justice in December 2012 for just such information. Plea Bargaining: Brendon
Mills Made this Official Information Act Request to Ministry of Justice, FYI.ORG.NZ (Jan. 28,
2013), https://fyi.org.nz/request/plea_bargaining [https://perma.cc/3NSM-YB5S] (I would like
to know how often plea bargaining (ie an offender pleads guilty in return for a lesser
charge/sentence) is used in the New Zealand justice system.). The Ministry responded by
noting that the Ministry of Justice does not hold any records of instances of plea bargaining.
Id.
103. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (Ninety-seven percent of federal
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C. Procedural Safeguards
Does your nation have procedural safeguards in place for the
protection of the defendant? To ensure integrity in the process for
the prosecution?
To a certain extent, this question seeks out institutional respons-
es to the now common bargaining practices to determine if there is
indeed a formal structure in place. What we find is a wide range. At
one end of the spectrum is the recent and detailed statutory scheme
in New Zealand. At the other, the English lawmakers and judges
seemingly are only reluctantly coming now to the acknowledgment
of, and acquiescence in, the practice of plea bargaining.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: There are no legislatively-
sanctioned safeguards. The cornerstone of the protection of both
the defendant and the State consists of case law that reinforces
the principle that judges make the sentencing decision, not the
parties.104 That may be cold comfort to a defendant who is seeking
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.)
(citations omitted); see also Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Courts Failure to Fix Plea
Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 565 (2014); Laurie
L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process: Missouri v. Frye & Lafler v.
Cooper, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 457, 459-63 (2013). The underlying statistical reports bear out
these remarkable numbers. See, e.g., GLENN R. SCHMITT & JENNIFER DUKES,U.S.SENTENCING
COMMN, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 4 (2012), http://www.
ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications-research-publications/2013/FY
12_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/3M48-ZTSJ]; MD.STATECOMMN
ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (2014), http://msccsp.org/Files/
Reports/ar2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAH8-PUXT]; VA.CRIMINALSENTENCINGCOMMN, 2013
ANNUAL REPORT 30 (2013), http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/2013AnnualReport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BK5H-BZQX]; STATE OF WASH. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, STATISTICAL SUM-
MARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 21 (2014), http://digital archives.
wa.gov/WA.Media/do/824EEE7B42A212A8FA67C030E74617FE.pdf [https://perma. cc/DZ75-
69GY].
104. See Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58, 58 (Austl.); GAS v The Queen (2004) 217
CLR 198, 211 (Austl.). There have been a number of cases in Western Australia where conces-
sions by the prosecution in respect of sentence were not accepted by the judge at first
instance, and those decisions were approved on appeal. See Drage v Western Australia [2015]
WASCA 145 at [47], [61]; McMaster v The Queen [2004] WASCA 52; Griffin v The Queen
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some certainty about the benefit he will receive by pleading guilty,
particularly as the High Court has said it is the defendants re-
sponsibility to decide whether to plead guilty. This decision cannot
be made with any foreknowledge of the sentence, other than the
advice provided by his representative on what might reasonably be
expected to happen.105
The system of plea negotiations relies to a substantial extent
upon trust between the parties. Maintaining a record of what is
agreed, in an agreed form of words, is an obvious safeguard, which
was commended by the High Court as the proper approach.106
Defense lawyers will usually obtain confirmation in writing of
their clients instructions. These will contain an acknowledgement
from their client of the advice they have received and their under-
standing of the significance of the guilty plea.107
There are measures in place in the various jurisdictions, in the
form of prosecution guidelines and internal procedures, to safe-
guard the integrity of the process for the prosecution and provide
some measure of protection for a defendant. For instance, the
Western Australian Guidelines stipulate that a plea will not be ac-
cepted if the accused person intimates that he or she is not guilty
of any offense.108 Also, they specifically provide that [m]ultiplicity
of charging should never be used in order to simply provide scope
for plea negotiation.109 In terms of safeguarding the integrity of
[2001] WASCA 11.
105. GAS, 217 CLR at 210-11. In Western Australia, section 9AA of the Sentencing Act
1995 provides some guarantee of a quantifiable amount of mitigation for a plea of guilty,
although only by reference to the maximum discount applicable (25 percent) when the plea
is entered at the first reasonable opportunity. See Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 9AA (Austl.).
This does not preclude further reductions for other mitigating factors.
106. In GAS v The Queen, the Court observed that such a record:
should reduce the scope for misunderstanding what is to be, or has been, agreed.
It should serve to focus the minds of counsel, and the parties .... Most
importantly, it enables counsel for both sides to be clear about the instructions
to be obtained from their respective clients and the matters about which, and
basis on which, counsel should tender advice to their respective clients. There
should then be far less room for subsequent debate about the basis on which an
accused person chose to enter a plea of guilty.
GAS, 217 CLR at 214-15.
107. See also LEGAL AID QUEENSL., CRIMINAL LAW DUTY LAWYER HANDBOOK ¶ 12-10 (6th
ed. 2014), https://perma.cc/9VKX-VFAS.
108. DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS FOR W. AUSTL., supra note 17, ¶ 76(b).
109. Id. ¶ 58(c).
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the process, the Guidelines stipulate that [c]harge negotiations
must be based on principle and reason, not on expedience alone and
that [a] written record of the charge negotiation must be kept in
the interests of transparency and probity.110 They further provide
that a plea will not be accepted if to do so would distort the facts
disclosed by the available evidence and result in an artificial basis
for sentence.111 They require consultation with the investigator and
victim, which must be recorded.112 In particular, the views of the
investigator and victim must be obtained before any substantial
and otherwise relevant and available evidence is omitted from a
negotiated statement of facts ... [although] the overriding consider-
ation [will be] the public interest.113 Finally, a plea to a lesser
offense or to only part of an indictment will be accepted only if
approved by a senior prosecutor who has delegated authority from
the Director of Public Prosecutions.114
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: In some Canadian jurisdictions,
such as the province of Ontario, counsel adhere to a formalized pro-
cess and fill out pretrial forms in advance of the meeting, setting out
their positions on the issues.115 These forms help to structure the
meeting by identifying issues that typically arise in criminal cases.
They also, in an ideal world, force counsel to think through the case
before entering the pretrial.
Of course, safeguards also flow from the ethical obligations that
rest upon Crown and defense counsel. The defense lawyer has an
obligation to take any resolution proposal to the accused for his or
her consideration.116 There are clearly defined limits on the
110. Id. ¶ 74.
111. Id. ¶ 76(a).
112. Id. ¶ 70A.
113. Id. ¶ 77.
114. Id. ¶ 80.
115. See ONT. SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE, FORM 17, PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE REPORT,
http://www.ontariocourtforms.on.ca/forms/scjcpr/form17/CSR-17-28-rev1113-En.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L7HA-K2K4].
116. See CAN. BAR ASSN, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ch. 9, ¶ 13 (2009).
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circumstances in which a defense lawyer can ethically plead a client
guilty.117
The Crown has an obligation to discuss any proposed resolution
with the complainant/victim in the case and/or the investigating
officer.118 This is not to say that the Crown is bound by such input.
To the contrary, the Crown, as a quasi minister of justice, must
make an independent determination of whether a resolution is in
the public interest.119
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: The only process that
involves the judge at all is that he may, not must, indicate a
sentence under Goodyear and only on the defenses request.120 Even
in the special fraud structure described, the judge is not involved at
all and is entitled to ignore the joint recommendation as to
sentence.121 The defendant may be unrepresentedunlikely at pre-
sent in serious fraud casesbut there are problems regarding
proposals on legal aid for serious trials, and we have had delays to
hearing some serious fraud cases currently up for trial because of
barrister strikes over fees.122 Protections from prosecutors guide-
lines only are cited, which set out prosecutor duties as to confidenti-
ality and fairness for the fraud negotiations.123
Otherwise, the only protections are in the professional Codes of
Ethics that apply to any solicitors and barristers involved.124 Maybe
it would be unnecessary to do more since parties are not in a
position to make promises regarding sentencing. The only direct
117. See id.
118. See PICCINATO, supra note 27, at 14.
119. See id. at 6.
120. See R v. Goodyear [2005] EWCA (Crim) 888 [56]-[57].
121. See Directors Guidance to Accompany the Attorney Generals Guidelines on Plea
Discussions in Cases of Serious or Complex Fraud, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (May 24,
2012), http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/directors_guidance/director_s_guidance_to_
accompany_the_attorney_general_s_guidelines_on_plea_discussions_in_cases_of_serious_o
r_complex_fraud.html [https://perma.cc/J953-EFJM] [hereinafter Directors Guidance].
122. Owen Bowcott, Criminal Justice Delays Grow as Legal Aid Boycott Takes Hold,
GUARDIAN (July 8, 2015, 10:55 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jul/08/criminal-
justice-delays-legal-aid-boycott [https://perma.cc/4MZK-GURH].
123. See Directors Guidance, supra note 121.
124. See BAR STANDARDS BD., THE BAR STANDARDS BOARD HANDBOOK 23-58 (2d ed. 2015).
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effect on sentencing in a British plea bargain would be where the
Crown accepts a plea to a lesser offense that carries such a low
maximum (compared with that for the initial charge) that the
courts hands are effectively tied (subject to the alleged power to
reject the guilty plea). But such cases are rare, because most sen-
tencing takes place a long way short of the maximum. It is far more
likely that the judge will refuse to accept the plea if the maxima are
miles apart, as in the case of rape, which carries a maximum of life
imprisonment, rather than sexual assault (formerly indecent
assault), which would carry a maximum of six months in the
magistrates court.125 Most magistrates are lay persons and so are
unlikely to take issue with a case where an apparently inappropri-
ate plea of guilty has been accepted by the prosecution. However,
there is an increasing tendency to prefer district judges, formerly
stipendiary magistrates, for the lower courts. These judges are
professionals and may take a stronger line and insist the case be
sent up to the Crown Court, where the maximum for sexual assault
would be ten years.126
* * *
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: Yes, procedural protections
are set out in the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.127 As I advised
before, the sentence indication process in New Zealand developed
informally. The important thing about the provisions of the Crimin-
al Procedure Act is that statutory validation is given to the sentence
indication process. The various procedures and, in particular, pro-
cedural safeguards make it clear that a sentence indication can only
be sought by an accused person.128 Furthermore, section 61(3) of the
Act sets out the type of information that a judge should have before
making a sentence indication.129 Full submissions are filed by both
prosecution and defense setting out the various aggravating and
mitigating circumstances of the offense and the offender together
125. See Sexual Offences Act 2003, c. 42, §§ 1(4), 3(4)(a) (U.K.).
126. Id. § 3(4)(b).
127. Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.).
128. Id. s 61(1).
129. See id. s 61(3).
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with authorities that may justify an argument for setting a sentence
at a particular level.130
The Act also provides in section 62(4) the circumstances where a
second sentence indication may be sought and given.131 Under the
informal practice prior to the Act, there was variation in approach
to seek a sentence indication, and the Act makes it clear that a
second indication can be sought only where there is a change of cir-
cumstances.132
The practice prior to the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Act
was that the judge who gave the sentence indication would be the
judge who sentenced. If it transpired that the judge who sentenced
after a sentence indication was different than the indicating judge
and the sentencing judge disagreed with the indication, the accused
should have been given an opportunity to reconsider the plea on the
basis of the earlier indication. That provision is not contained in the
legislation but is a matter of practice.
The importance of the provisions of sections 60-65 of the Act is
that they clarify matters of practice where there had previously
been some variation under the informal scheme.
The statutory recognition of the previously informal process of
sentence indications has clarified the validity of such process beyond
doubt. The statute makes it clear what is required by the indicating
judge and introduces an element of finalitythe one chance rule
subject to changing circumstances.
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: Rule 11like similar state pro-
visions133contains the only enforceable procedural safeguards
governing plea agreements.134 The most detailed section of the Rule
specifies what the court must do before it can accept a defendants
plea of guilty. The Rule requires the court to address the defendant
130. Id. s 67.
131. See id. s 62(4).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1192.1-.5 (West 2015); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-4
(West 2015); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (West 2015); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-254, 19.2-296 (West 2015).
134. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
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personally in open court to make sure the defendant understands
exactly what it means to plead guilty and what the defendant is
giving up by pleading guilty.135 The court must explain to all
defendants that, if they plead guilty, they will be giving up the
constitutional rights associated with a trial listed in the Rule.136
The Rule also requires the court to describe the salient terms of
the plea agreement.137 These include the governments right to use
any statements made by the defendant against the defendant in a
prosecution for perjury, the nature of the charges, the maximum
and minimum possible penalties, and the terms of any waivers.138
Most recently, the Rule added a provision requiring courts to notify
all defendants seeking to plead guilty that anyone pleading guilty
who is not a U.S. citizen may be removed from the United States,
denied citizenship, and denied future admission to the United
States.139
The court must also satisfy itself that a defendant is voluntarily
pleading guilty and that no promises have been made outside of the
plea agreement itself.140 Finally, the Rule requires the court to en-
sure that there is a sufficient factual basis for the plea.141 This is
generally accomplished by asking the prosecution to read the factual
basis set out in the plea agreement and then asking the defendant
whether he or she agrees with the facts as written. Some courts
require defendants to state in open court exactly what they did.
Although most plea agreements are accepted by the courts, a
plea is occasionally rejected because the court believes it is unjust,
the factual basis is inadequate, or the defendant has been coerced
or misled into pleading guilty.142 When that happens, the court must
inform the defendant that he or she may withdraw the plea and
that the court may then treat the defendant less favorably than
contemplated by the plea agreement.143 Because all bargaining
135. Id. r. 11(b)(2).
136. Id. r. 11(b)(1)(F).
137. Id. r. 11(b)(1).
138. Id.
139. Id. r. 11(b)(1)(O).
140. Id. r. 11(b)(2).
141. Id. r. 11(b)(3).
142. Id. r. 11(b)(1)-(3).
143. Id. r. 11(c)(5)(C).
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occurs outside the presence of the court, however, courts know so
little about the case or the equities prior to the plea that rejections
are rare.144
As a rule, United States Attorneys have wide discretion in nego-
tiating guilty pleas in criminal cases.145 In 2010, the U.S. Attorney
General issued a memorandum on charging, modifying earlier mem-
oranda issued by the Department of Justice. The new memo stated:
Plea agreements should reflect the totality of a defendants
conduct. These agreementsare governed by the same fundamen-
tal principle as charging decisions: prosecutors should seek a
plea to the most serious offense that is consistent with the
nature of the defendants conduct and likely to result in a sus-
tainable conviction, informed by an individualized assessment
of the specific facts and circumstances of each particular case.
Charges should not be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a
plea, nor should charges be abandoned to arrive at a plea bar-
gain that does not reflect the seriousness of the defendants
conduct. All plea agreements should be consistent with the
Principles of Federal Prosecution and must be reviewed by a
supervisory attorney. Each office shall promulgate written
guidance regarding the standard elements required in its plea
agreements, including the waivers of a defendants rights.146
D. Restrictions
Are there any restrictions as to the types of defendants or cases
for which bargaining is not allowed?
One could easily imagine a criminal justice system in which cer-
tain sorts of crimes were considered off limits for negotiating. What
144. If a court does reject a plea agreement and the defendant is allowed to withdraw the
plea, the defendant has three choices: attempt to negotiate a different agreement which will
be more acceptable to the court, plead blind without any agreement, or go to trial.
145. U.S. DEPT OFJUSTICE,U.S.ATTORNEYSMANUAL § 9-16.030 (2000), http://www.justice.
gov/usam/usam-9-16000-pleas-federal-rule-criminal-procedure-11#9-16.030 [https://perma.cc/
WE9T-5E8S].
146. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors (May
19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/holder-memo-charg
ing-sentencing.pdf [https://perma.cc/R58G-842Y]. It should be noted that the policies described
in Mr. Holders memo are not enforceable by the courts.
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the responses make clear is that in all the subject countries, no se-
rious crime is considered off the bargaining table.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: There are no such restrictions
in Western Australia, and I am not aware of any in other Austral-
ian jurisdictions. There will ordinarily be limits, however, that
attach to the authority of any particular prosecutor (other than a
Director or Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions), depending on
their position within the hierarchy of a prosecuting office, as to the
type of offenses they can compromise without obtaining authority
from someone at a higher level.147
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: There are no restrictions on the
types of cases that can attract resolution discussions. They can occur
in any and all cases, including homicide prosecutions.
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: With no formal system
in place, we do not have such restrictions.148
* * *
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: I do not understand that to be
the case. If a sentence indication were to be sought for murder, the
indication would relate to a minimum parole period. Murder carries
an automatic life sentence upon conviction.149
* * *
147. See NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶ 1.13.
148. For an overview of the practice, see ANDREW ASHWORTH & MIKE REDMAYNE, THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS 301 (4th ed. 2010).
149. See Sentencing Act 2002, s 102 (N.Z.).
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United States, Ms. Brook: The only restrictions would be inter-
nal restrictions imposed by the Attorney General on the U.S. At-
torneys and would change with different administrations. I am not
aware that any such restrictions currently exist. Plea bargaining is
allowed in every type of case, including murder and terrorism cases,
although a prosecutor may refuseor be instructed to refuseto
negotiate in a particular case.
E. Roles
What is the role of the lawyers and the judge in the process?
Once again, we were looking to see if the set rules differ greatly
in the countries in which our colleagues practice, judge, and teach.
They differ considerably.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: Although from time to time, in
pretrial directions hearings, judges150 may make comments design-
ed to encourage one or both of the parties to reconsider their posi-
tion, the judge has no role in plea negotiations. The rationale was
explained by Justices Dawson and McHugh in Maxwell v The Queen:
The decision whether to charge a lesser offence, or to accept a
plea of guilty to a lesser offence than that charged, is for the
prosecution and does not require the approval of the court.
Indeed, the court would seldom have the knowledge of the
strengths and weaknesses of the case on each side which is
necessary for the proper exercise of such a function. The role of
the prosecution in this respect, as in many others, is such that
it cannot be shared with the trial judge without placing in
jeopardy the essential independence of that office in the adver-
sary system.151
The High Court has made clear that it is the States responsibility
to decide which charges to proceed with, and that it is the judges
150. For a discussion of the role of lawyers, see supra Part I.A.
151. (1996) 184 CLR 501, 513 (Austl.) (footnote omitted).
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role to determine an appropriate sentence based on the facts pre-
sented to the court. In discussing the plea bargain process, the
Court said that, while there may be an understanding between
counsel as to what evidence will be provided, or what sentencing or
legal submissions will be made at the sentencing hearing, that un-
derstanding does not bind the judge in determining the sentence,
other than in the practical sense that the judge may be limited to
the agreed summary of facts presented.152
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: I discuss the respective roles of
the participants in resolution discussions in Part I.A.
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: With no formal system
in place, it is impossible to evaluate their role.153
* * *
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: The lawyer initiates the
process by requesting a sentence indication.154 A date is set for a
hearing.155 Submissions are filed by the defense and prosecution.156
At the hearing, after argument the judge gives an indication as to
sentence.157 If accepted, the accused pleads guilty and is sentenced
after the necessary reports are obtained.158 The defense commonly
makes further submissions at sentencing, generally to persuade the
judge of factors that may reduce the indicated sentence.
The judge is not involved in any negotiations or discussions
between lawyers. On occasion, sentence indications will involve dis-
152. See GAS v The Queen (2004) 217 CLR 198, 211 (Austl.).
153. Suggestions as to a more formal and transparent process have been made. See, e.g.,
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, REDUCTION IN SENTENCE FOR A GUILTY PLEA: DEFINITIVE
GUIDELINE, at i-ii (2007).
154. Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 61 (N.Z.).
155. Id. s 62(1).
156. Id. s 62(3).
157. Id. s 62.
158. Id. s 61(3).
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cussions between the lawyers as to the contents of a summary of
facts. Also, on occasion, reductions of charges from a more serious
offense to a less serious one, and sometimes agreed positions relat-
ing to aggravating and mitigating circumstances that generally are
apparent from the summary of facts or surrounding evidential
material, may be placed before the judge.
The position of the judge is essentially a passive one, and no
discussion is entered into between the judge and counsel as to the
contents of the summary of facts, although it is accepted practice
that the judge may suggest, where it is clear, that there may have
been overcharging. This may be more usual at a case review hear-
ing rather than a sentence indication one.
The only time that a judge really becomes involved in a factual
evaluation is where prosecution and defense have been unable to
agree upon the facts; it is common practice, then, for the judge to
call a disputed fact hearing to identify the facts before making a
sentence indication. These hearings may take place not only within
the sentence indication context but also as part of the overall sen-
tencing process. However, disputed fact hearings are not often called
for.
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: Because Rule 11 prohibits judges from
any substantive involvement in plea negotiations,159 the judges role
in the process in federal court is extremely limited.160 The judge may
159. See United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2148 (2013) (the parties and the Court
agreed that the magistrate judges involvement in plea negotiations violated Rule 11(c)(1)s
prohibition on judicial participation in plea discussions).
160. Most states have similar restrictions. See, e.g., McDaniel v. State, 522 S.E.2d 648,
650 (Ga. 1999) (Judicial participation in the plea negotiation process is prohibited by court
rule in this state and in the federal system.); State v. Moe, 479 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992) (It is error for a trial court judge to participate directly in plea agreement nego-
tiations.); Fermo v. State, 370 So. 2d 930, 933 (Miss. 1979) ([The judge] should never become
involved, or participate, in the plea bargaining process. He must remain aloof from such
negotiations.); Cripps v. State, 137 P.3d 1187, 1191 (Nev. 2006) ([W]e expressly prohibit any
judicial participation in the formulation or discussions of a potential plea agreement.);
Commonwealth v. Evans, 252 A.2d 689, 691 (Pa. 1969) ([W]e feel compelled to forbid any
participation by the trial judge in the plea bargaining prior to the offering of a guilty plea.).
In a few states, while the courts express strong reservations about such involvement,
they do not ban it outright. See People v. Weaver, 118 Cal. App. 4th 131, 148 (Ct. App. 2004);
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only decide how much time to give the parties to negotiate and
whether to accept or reject the plea agreement.
Although it might not sound like much, the judges decision on
how much time to give the parties to negotiate will almost always
make a significant difference in the outcome. A decision to plead
guilty should be made only after obtaining enough knowledge to
make a reasonable decision.161 That knowledge can be obtained only
through defense investigation, through a review of the discovery
material disclosed by the prosecution, or through information ob-
tained by court order. To be meaningful, all three require time. For
example, a defendant may need time to obtain old records or to find
and hire an expert to show that he suffered from specific trauma as
a child. Or a defendant may benefit from lengthy drug treatment
prior to entering a plea. Or the court may grant a defense motion
requesting that the government provide the defense with a bill of
particulars or other discovery material. Having the time to engage
in these activities can directly affect the terms the prosecutor is
willing to include in an agreement. In addition, time will always
affect the defense lawyers ability to develop a meaningful relation-
ship with his or her client. The better the relationship between the
lawyer and client, the more likely it is that whatever plea agree-
ment is finally hammered out will be a just agreement that is
acceptable to the client.
The judges limited role leaves it to the lawyers to play the prima-
ry role in plea negotiations. This can mean a series of discussions
between the defense and prosecution lawyers, with the defense law-
yer then relaying all information back to his or her client. Or it can
mean a proffer session (or sessions) with the lawyers, the client, and
federal agents present.162 Because the prosecutor negotiating the
Crumb v. People, 230 P.3d 726, 731 (Colo. 2010); Anderson v. State, 335 N.E.2d 225, 227
(Ind. 1975); State v. Ditter, 441 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Neb. 1989); State v. Byrd, 407 N.E.2d 1384,
1388 (Ohio 1980).
161. It is notable that the decision to go to trial or to plead guilty is one of only a handful
of decisions that the defendant alone may make under the law. The defendants decision
trumps any advice counsel may give, making it even more important that the defendant
receive as much information as possible prior to making the decision. The other decisions that
belong to the defendant alone are whether to testify at trial, to speak in allocution at
sentencing, and to appeal.
162. See, e.g., David P. Leonard, Lets Negotiate a Deal: Waiver of Protections Against the
Use of Plea Bargains and Plea Bargaining Statements After Mezzanatto, 23 CRIM. JUST. 8
(2008).
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plea does not have final say in the process, even after the defendant
has agreed to a particular agreement, supervisors may ultimately
reject the agreement, sending the parties back to square one.
F. Public Debate
Has there been a public debate concerning plea bargaining?
What arguments have been offered publicly in favor of or against
the process?
With the responses to this question, we see perhaps the sharpest
division in our subject countries. In England, for instance, there ap-
pears to be little public discussion about plea bargaining beyond
what we see in judicial opinions, and even these are of limited scope.
In the United States, however, the debate has been both vigorous
and quite public, with participants including judges, lawyers, aca-
demics, editorial writers, and lawmakers.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: There has not been a general
public debate. Occasionally, individual cases will generate public
criticism about particular plea agreements by people disaffected by
the outcome. This is usually followed by commentary and perhaps
public discourse in the media about the appropriateness of the
prosecution compromising matters, rather than leaving it to a jury
to decide the degree of culpability. Such commentaries usually
overlook, or are made in ignorance of, the fact that prosecutors are
generally more robust in their assessment of appropriate charges
than juries tend to be in their verdicts, at least in relation to certain
offenses. There have been instances in which particular interest
groups have raised concerns about specific areas of criminal justice,
for instance in relation to cases of domestic homicide or assaults
upon police and other public officers.163
163. In the latter case, mandatory prison sentences apply in Western Australia if certain
aggravating circumstances are proved. LENNYROTH,N.S.W.PARLIAMENTARYRESEARCHSERV.,
MANDATORY SENTENCING LAWS 8 (2014), http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/
publications.nsf/key/Mandatorysentencinglaws/$File/mandatory+sentencing+laws.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4JZX-G5QL]. Whether at the point of charging, or in a plea negotiation, the
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Debate about the merits of plea bargaining as a process, however,
has largely been left to academic writers.164 Arguments that are put
against the process tend to focus on:
(1) the potential for undue pressure to be put on defendants to
plead guilty;165
(2) a perceived lack of consideration of victims;166 and
(3) negative perceptions of the States motivations for engaging
in negotiations, in particular that expediency is put before jus-
tice.167
These negative perceptions are said to stem from the informality
and lack of statutory regulation of the process, and the consequent
belief that there is a lack of transparency and scrutiny of the con-
duct of the prosecutor, who is required to act in the public interest.
So, while some critics are fundamentally opposed to the very notion
of negotiated criminal justice, the more moderate position is that
the above factors provide cogent reasons for formalizing the pro-
cess.168
A particular area of concern is the sanitizing of facts as part of a
plea agreement. One commentator has suggested that relevant and
provable aggravating facts may be withheld from the court in order
to secure a plea of guilty.169 If it happens without consultation with
the victim, it is nothing less than a corruption of the legal process
and an attempt to pervert the course of justice,170 as the court is
denied knowledge of the true circumstances in which the plea was
made. As stated earlier, guidelines or practice will usually provide
for consultation with victims and rejection of an offer that results in
prosecuting authority (which will be the police if the matter proceeds in the magistrates court)
will need to decide whether, in the specific circumstances of the case, it is in the public in-
terest to proceed with the aggravated offense. If the answer is resolved in the negative, the
officer who is the victim, and his union, will often disagree.
164. See, e.g., Paul Gerber, When Is Plea Bargaining Justified?, 3 QUEENSL. U. TECH. L. &
JUST. J. 1 (2003).
165. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 1, at 376-82.
166. E.g., ASHER FLYNN & KATE FITZ-GIBBON, A SECOND CHANCE FOR JUSTICE: THE PRO-
SECUTIONS OF GABE WATSON FOR THE DEATH OF TINA THOMAS 86 (2013) (ebook).
167. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 1, at 363-64.
168. Id.
169. See Gerber, supra note 164, at 3.
170. Id.
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a distortion of the facts, although a prosecutor must exercise judg-
ment about whether certain facts will be essential to the sentencing
process and the prospects of establishing those facts if put to
proof.171
The arguments in favor of plea negotiations tend to focus on the
saving of resources, the emotional and financial benefits to all par-
ties that come from pleas of guilty, and the consequent reduction in
the duration of criminal proceedings.172 It is also recognized that the
process encourages the parties to minimize the number of issues in
contention prior to trial, in the event that agreement is not
reached.173 The reduction in the number of trials and the duration
of those that proceed should result in cases getting to trial sooner.
The need to reduce delay in the criminal justice system has certain-
ly been an issue that has received publicity. It is generally accepted
that justice is better served if trials can be heard at the earliest
opportunity after all relevant evidence has been gathered, when
witnesses will be more readily available and their memories of
events relatively fresh.174
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: One of the foundational
documents in Canada is The Report of the Attorney Generals Ad-
visory Committee on Charge Screening, Disclosure, and Resolution
171. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
172. See NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶¶ 1.5-.9.
173. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, CONSOLIDATED PRACTICE
DIRECTIONS, PD 5.3, at ¶ 14 (2009), http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/_files/Consolidated_
Practice_Directions.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BS3-UNPM]; Hon. Wayne Martin, Chief Justice
of Western Australia, Address at the Australian Legal Convention: The Future of Case Man-
agement 11-12 (Sept. 19, 2009), http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/_files/Australian_Legal_
Convention300909.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX6E-LN2Q].
174. As the NSW LRC observes: In human terms, the stressful effects of prolongation,
repeated attendance at court and ongoing uncertainty can be disruptive and distressing to
victims, witnesses, relatives and others concerned with the proceedings, including the
defendant. NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶ 1.9. The NSW LRC inquiry appears to be the latest
invitation to a public debate about the issue, albeit with the objective of promoting early
resolution of criminal cases. The purpose of the consultation paper is to stimulate discussion
on what models (or combination of models) might or should be taken up and adapted to the
NSW criminal justice system. Id. at 1.
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Discussions, released in 1993.175 The report outlined some of the
perceived shortcomings of unregulated plea bargaining:
Perceived problems with plea bargaining include its secrecy; the
fact that negotiated pleas bypass the procedural protections of
a trial by an impartial judge and, thus, prevent coerced pleas or
other unethical conduct being discovered; the tendency for coun-
sel to take unduly harsh tactical positions to obtain bargaining
leverage (a practice which the Committee has noted and dis-
approved of in the preceding chapter); and concern that plea
bargaining outcomes will bear little relationship to the circum-
stances of the offence or offender, because plea bargaining is a
system in which the merits of the case take second place to the
bargaining strength and skills of the parties.
Ultimately, much of the objection to plea bargaining found in
the literature is premised on the assumption that bartering and
justice are two very different ideas: Justice should not be, and
should not be seen to be, something that can be purchased at the
bargaining table.176
Since 1993, resolution discussions have become far more structured,
and this has addressed many of the above concerns. For example,
while discussions occur in private, the judge will often place the sub-
stance of those discussions on the record in the event of a guilty
plea. The very presence of a judge injects the promise of an objective
referee, who is concerned with maintaining the integrity of the ad-
ministration of justice.
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: There has been no pub-
lic debate, but a House of Commons Committee said that plea-
bargain expansion could have significant consequences and needs
great care and consideration.177 The practice must not drift to-
wards a situation where it is commonplace without discussing [its
175. ONT. MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALS ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON CHARGE SCREENING, DISCLOSURE, AND RESOLUTION DISCUSSIONS (1993).
176. Id. at 276-77 (footnotes omitted).
177. HOUSE OF COMMONS JUSTICE COMM.,THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE:GATEKEEPER
OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2008-09, HC 186, ¶ 45 (U.K.).
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desirability and] what safeguards must be put in place for defen-
dants, victims, and the public.178 One prominent scholar expressed
unhappiness with a more formal process because it would shift the
balance of power if the prosecution becomes the initiator.179 The
Director of Public Prosecutions agreed that safeguards are
needed.180
Interesting discussion can be seen in some judicial decisions. In
one, McKinnon v. United States, the defendant resisted extradition
while accused of hacking into American government (including mil-
itary) computers.181 He argued that American engagement in plea
bargainingincluding a threat that unless he agreed to be extra-
dited, the United States would oppose repatriation to the United
Kingdom to serve his sentencewas an abuse of process.182 Part of
his argument focused on the wide disparity between a sentence, if
he cooperated, of three to four years (including six to twelve months
in a low-security prison in the United States after prospects of
repatriation and parole), and on the other hand, if he refused, eight
to ten years or more in U.S. high-security prison.183 He asserted that
the disparity was disproportionate and subjected the appellant to
impermissible pressure to surrender his legal rights.184
Lord Brown said in the House of Lords:
[T]he difference between the American system and our own is
not perhaps so stark as the appellants argument suggests. In
this country too there is a clearly recognised discount for a plea
of guilty: a basic discount of one-third for saving the cost of the
trial, more if a guilty plea introduces other mitigating factors,
and more still (usually one half to two thirds but exceptionally
three-quarters or even beyond that) .... No less importantly, it is
accepted practice in this country for the parties to hold off-the-
record discussions whereby the prosecutor will accept pleas of
guilty to lesser charges (or on a lesser factual basis) in return for
a defendants timely guilty plea. Indeed the entire premise of the
178. Id.
179. Id. ¶ 41 (describing evidence from Nicola Padfield).
180. Id. ¶ 43.
181. [2008] UKHL 59, [2008] 1 WLR 1739, 1742.
182. Id. at 1747.
183. Id. at 1744-45.
184. Id. at 1747.
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principle established in R v Goodyear ... is that the parties will
have reached an agreed basis of plea in private before the judge
is approached. What, it must be appreciated Goodyear forbids
are judicial, not prosecutorial, indications of sentence. Indeed,
Goodyear goes further than would be permitted in the United
States by allowing the judge in certain circumstances to indicate
what sentence he would pass.185
Lord Brown went on:
The Divisional Court [in the instant case] expressed their cul-
tural reservations about the general American style of plea-
bargaining and in particular a degree of distaste as to the
prosecutors approach towards providing or withdrawing support
for repatriation. These comments seem to me somewhat fasti-
dious. Our law is replete with statements of the highest author-
ity counselling not merely a broad and liberal construction of
extradition laws (to serve the transnational interest in bringing
to justice those accused of serious cross-border crimes), but also
the need in the conduct of extradition proceedings to accommo-
date legal and cultural differences between the legal systems of
the many foreign friendly states with whom the UK has entered
into reciprocal extradition arrangements.186
He concluded:
It seems to me, however, no more appropriate to describe the
predicted consequences of non-cooperation as a threat than to
characterise the predicted consequences of co-operation as a
promise (or, indeed, a bribe). In one sense all discounts for
pleas of guilty could be said to subject the defendant to pressure,
and the greater the discount the greater the pressure. But the
discount would have to be very substantially more generous
than anything promised here (as to the way the case would be
put and the likely outcome) before it constituted unlawful pres-
sure such as to vitiate the process. So too would the predicted
consequences of non-co-operation need to go significantly beyond
what could properly be regarded as the defendants just desserts
on conviction for that to constitute unlawful pressure.... It is
185. Id. at 1749 (citations omitted).
186. Id. at 1749-50 (citation omitted).
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difficult, indeed, to think of anything other than the threat of
unlawful action which could fairly be said so to imperil the
integrity of the extradition process as to require the accused,
notwithstanding his having resisted the undue pressure, to be
discharged irrespective of the strength of the case against him.187
* * *
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: No. The only debate has been
a low-level one within the legal profession. Sentence indications are
seen as a way of making the process more efficient.
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: The debate here has been both intense
and prolonged, not only among the legal community,188 but among
the general public as well. Much of the debate is fueled by three
factors: the racial disparity between those sentenced to prison and
those who are not, particularly in drug cases; the enormous shift in
sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors; and the continuing
revelations that innocent persons plead guilty and are sentenced to
prison pursuant to plea agreements.
As mentioned above, the Supreme Courts decisions in Lafler and
Frye generated a great deal of public discussion. The Los Angeles
Times published an editorial just after the decisions were announ-
ced, entitled A System of Plea Bargains, which, while lauding the
Courts concerns, reiterated one Justices warning that the current
plea-bargaining system presents grave risks of prosecutorial over-
charging that effectively compels an innocent defendant to avoid
massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense.189
Several months later, The Wall Street Journal also published a
story highlighting the risk to the innocent:
187. Id. at 1750-51.
188. The debate among judges, lawyers, and scholars has raged for decades. For excellent
recent overviews of the various positions and collections of the source materials, see Gregory
M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 145
(2011); Levenson, supra note 103, at nn.3-9.
189. Editorial, A System of Plea Bargains, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2012, at A13 (quoting
Justice Scalias concerns).
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The triumph of plea bargaining in the federal system, which has
gathered pace in recent years, is nearly complete.... This relent-
less growth in plea bargaining has sparked a backlash among
lawyers, legal scholars and judgesevidenced by recent federal
court decisions, including two from the Supreme Court. Weigh-
ing on many critics is the possibility ... that the innocent could
feel pressured into pleading guilty.190
An editorial in The Washington Post focused on how prosecutors are
able to load up on charges they can later drop, pressuring defen-
dants to cooperate before trial and plead guilty.191
[R]ecognizing the primary role that plea bargaining has come to
play in the justice system, the Supreme Court this year [in
Lafler and Frye] began to extend judicial supervision over the
process, ruling that defendants have a right to competent coun-
sel in plea negotiations. The justices should not be the only ones
examining the dominance of plea bargaining. State officials,
legal scholars, the Justice Department and perhaps Congress
should more thoroughly consider whether and how to make the
nations system of pleas, not of trials, more predictable or pro-
cedurally sound.192
G. Policy
In your opinion is plea bargaining a positive system? A neces-
sary one?
Is the practice of plea bargaining a good development?: what a
difficult question to answer. Our participants bring a wealth of dif-
ferent experiences, in different nations, and come to answers that
may themselves raise more questions than they answer.
* * *
190. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Federal Guilty Pleas Soar as Bargains Trump Tri-
als, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100008723
96390443589304577637610097206808 [https://perma.cc/2JB8-9BLH].
191. Editorial, A Fairer Deal for Those Who Plea-Bargain, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-fairer-deal-for-those-who-plea-bargain/
2012/10/03/47fa81ce-081d-11e2-858a-5311df86ab04_story.html [https://perma.cc/LDK8-ZGZS].
192. Id.
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Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: Plea bargaining is a necessity.
Much of the public discussion about measures to reduce delays in
the criminal justice system has been led by the courts, usually by
the Chief Justice of a jurisdiction. Those measures almost invari-
ably include the need for the State and the defense to confer with a
view to early resolution. That is certainly a feature of a system im-
plemented in the Supreme Court of Western Australia (which deals
with most homicide cases and armed robberies in the state), which
involves colocation of a Magistrates Court within the Supreme
Court precincts, presided over by Supreme Court Registrars, and
the availability of voluntary criminal case conferencing (VCCC) fa-
cilitated by ex-judges of the District Court.193
The fact is that a substantial majority of defendants plead guilty
to the charges brought against them.194 The number of cases in
which there is initially a plea of not guilty, however, is still suffi-
ciently large that the court system would be overwhelmed if they all
proceeded to trial, and significant delays would occur.195
There will usually be matters that one side or the other in a case
may not be aware of, and which may affect their position. There is
no doubt that the resolution of a prosecution without trial can be
aided by the airing of such matters in a confidential setting, with
the result that areas of contention are reduced or removed after
appropriate investigations and negotiations. Achieving appropriate
pleas of guilty by those means is good for victims, defendants, and
other stakeholders.196 Pleas of guilty provide certainty for all par-
ties, prevent appeals (at least against conviction), and limit the time
defendants may spend in custody on remand pending trial if they
are refused or cannot make bail. As one of my colleagues put it, a
sentenced prisoner has greater access to programs than a remand
prisoner, and a sentenced offender who should appropriately be
released into the community can commence rehabilitation at the
earliest stage, rather than becoming institutionalised while await-
ing trial.197
193. See NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶¶ 5.14-.24 for a detailed discussion of the system.
194. See id. ¶ 2.4.
195. See id. ¶ 2.16.
196. Any trial involves a significant imposition on witnesses and jurors and on their em-
ployers and families. See id. ¶ 1.9.
197. E-mail from Amanda Forrester, Consultant State Prosecutor, Office of the Dir. of
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Finally, it is in the interest of the community that the resources
of its prosecution service are used efficiently. In terms of trial prep-
aration, a prosecutors time and effort are a resource that should be
allocated to cases that must inevitably proceed to trial, rather than
to those in which a plea of guilty may be entered late in the process,
and which could have been resolved earlier.
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: Resolution discussions are
certainly important in Canada, given the demands on the justice
system. The system benefits from having a mechanism that reduces
the number of criminal trials. The extent of that benefit will vary
depending upon the jurisdiction and the crush of the justice work-
load. In some places, it is a necessity.
That said, resolution discussions are also a mechanism for the
attainment of justice. When a judge, as an objective party, presides
over these discussions, she injects a reality check for the parties.
The discussion of the caseits strengths and weaknessescan
assist both counsel in understanding the realities of their position.
This, in turn, can lead to an informed and considered reassessment
where appropriate. The goal is not just to achieve efficiency, but
rather, to achieve justice in a more efficient manner.
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: It is clearly not a ne-
cessity. Negotiations can take place without the complex array of
possible charges through predictable sentences and prosecution
involvement in sentences that plea bargains properly require. As I
have written, if principles such as equality of arms and judicial
neutrality are observed, plea bargaining is consistent with the ad-
versarial notion of the just settlement of disputes, conferring legit-
imacy on the process. When legal services are unequally distributed,
the bargain may be unfair, distorting accuracy of decision making
and endangering the rule of law.198 Here we are much more
Pub. Prosecutions for W. Austl., to Bruno Fiannaca SC, Deputy Dir., Office of the Dir. of Pub.
Prosecutions for W. Austl. (Sept. 17, 2014) (on file with author).
198. Jenny McEwan, From Adversarialism to Managerialism: Criminal Justice in Tran-
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exercised by the legal aid cuts than anything else; it would affect
freedom and equity in negotiation if defendants were unrepre-
sented, as is likely to be the case if things carry on as they are. The
effect of funding on legal advice also needs scrutiny. If counsel is
paid by the State as much for a guilty plea as for a fought trial (or
vice versa), that might be significant.
* * *
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: Practice seems to have vali-
dated the effectiveness of sentence indications as a means of dealing
with cases efficiently when there is little doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.
I am unsure whether experience in the United States demon-
strates a reluctance on the part of accused people to bite the bullet
and take responsibility for their actions. Often cases that are hotly
contested at the beginning result in a plea of guilty at or just before
the hearing, when accused persons finally face up to the reality of
the situation and the strength of evidence against them. Sentence
indications can give the hesitant accused an opportunity to look
ahead and ascertain a likely outcome.
The efficiencies can be summarized as follows:
(1) Sentence indications can often result in a meritless case
avoiding trial.
(2) Sentence indications give an accused person an opportunity
to consider a guilty plea well before trial.
(3) Without sentence indications, the time allocated for trial of-
ten would collapse. From my own experience, I can recall days
when an entire defended case list before a judge would collapse
as a result of accused persons finally recognizing the strength of
the prosecutions case against them.
(4) Therefore, sentence indications provide a winnowing effect
with the result that more contested cases are reaching trial.
Are they a necessity? I think practice is making them so. If we
were to return to an environment when sentence indications were
not given, it would result in inefficiencies in court procedure, last-
sition, 31 LEGAL STUD. 519, 525-28 (2011).
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minute guilty pleas, judicial and court down time, and further de-
lays in the court process. Our court systems are quite overburdened
as it is, and sentence indications do have the effect of reducing that
burden to a certain degree. For those reasons, I think that, as the
result of practice, they have become a necessity.
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: That is kind of a trick question. In
these times, it may be a positive system because it is the only way
to eliminate some of the more draconian enhancements that can be
brought to bear by prosecutors when defendants choose to go to
trial. Many of these enhancements are described in a recent study
conducted by Human Rights Watch.199
Does plea bargaining conserve scarce resources, saving time and
money? Absolutely. Would the system crash if every case went to
trial? Again, absolutely. Is it in every defendants best interest to go
to trial? Under the current system, absolutely not.
All of these are important considerations. But, as one judge wrote:
These gains in efficiency are not ... without consequence.... The glut
of plea bargaining and the pandemic waiver of [trial] rights have
rendered trial by jury an inconvenient artifact.200 And as another
noted more recently: Because there is no judicial check on the en-
hanced mandatory minimums prosecutors can inject into a case,
they can put enormous pressure on defendants to plead guilty. In
many cases, only a daring risk-taker can withstand that pressure.
Most people buckle under it.201
Is plea bargaining a necessity? Again, that is a difficult question
to answer because of the chicken and egg phenomenon. Congress
has created thousands of federal crimesso many that no one is
able to count them, and many do not even require proof of criminal
intent.202 As we discuss elsewhere, Congress and many states have
199. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CANT REFUSE: HOW U.S. FEDERAL PROSE-
CUTORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 4-6 (2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us1213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJA7-4PFX].
200. United States v. Vanderwerff, No. 12-cr-00069, 2012 WL 2514933, at *4 (D. Colo. June
28, 2012).
201. United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
202. See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count Nations
Federal Criminal Laws, WALLST.J. (July 23, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
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also given prosecutors unprecedented leverage in plea bargaining by
enacting so many crimes that carry mandatory minimum
sentences.203 It is the prosecutions choice of charges today that
determines the sentence, not the discretion of the court. Under these
circumstances, plea bargaining does become a necessity.
H. Reforms
If you could change your process, what would you do?
In dealing with a recent comprehensive statutory overhaul of the
system, as one finds in New Zealand, the interest in major changes
isnot surprisinglylimited. With other systems, however, in
which no such overhaul has taken place, at least not in recent years,
some strong concerns are expressed here.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: I would explore measures to en-
sure that proper consideration of the materials by both parties, and
the taking of instructions by defense counsel, take place prior to
committal to a superior court,204 so that discussions could be un-
dertaken properly at an early stage. Sometimes, that capability is
impeded by delays in the disclosure of materials by the investigating
agency (including the obtaining of forensic reports), but there are
other practical factors at play that can result in matters being listed
for trial before meaningful discussions occur. In cases of legal aid
defendants, for instance, the remuneration arrangements of legal
aid offices tend to be a disincentive for private practitioners to do
substantial work on a case early for the purpose of negotiations if
there is a prospect that agreement will not be reached and the mat-
ter will proceed to trial in any event.205 Such arrangements tend to
1424052702304319804576389601079728920 [https://perma.cc/7JDR-GCPD]; see also Gary
Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904060604576
570801651620000 [https://perma.cc/2HNC-EE57].
203. See infra Part I.H for a discussion of the impact of mandatory minimum sentences.
204. See the response infra Part I.I for an outline of the committal process.
205. See, e.g., GOVT OF S. AUSTL. ATTORNEY-GEN.S DEPT, REVIEW OF THE PROVISION AND
PROCUREMENT OF LEGAL AID SERVICES IN SOUTH AUSTRALIAS CRIMINAL COURTS: FIRST RE-
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limit the amount of getting up for which the practitioner will be
paid.206 Any change in the process would need to address issues of
that kind.
Otherwise, notwithstanding the arguments that may be put for
greater oversight, judicial or otherwise, in my view there is no need
to formalize the process. As my colleague put it, regulation by
definition places restrictions that would, in all likelihood, be a det-
riment to the process by inhibiting the flexible application of prin-
ciples to obtain the best outcome.207 Published guidelines setting
out the factors to be taken into account provide for transparency.208
This, of course, is from a prosecutors perspective, but the High
Courts decisions referred to earlier tend to militate against any
formalization that involves judicial intervention.209
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: In the Martin Committee Re-
port, referred to above, Recommendation 60 provided:
The Committee is of the opinion that Crown and defence coun-
sel have a professional obligation to meet prior to trial where
appropriate to resolve issues. The Committee is of the opinion
that both Crown and defence counsel have a professional obli-
gation to act responsibly in arranging meetings and responding
to initiatives aimed at resolving criminal cases as early as pos-
sible. This will reduce demand for court time and ensure that
court time scheduled is used efficiently.210
This recommendation is not always honored in practice. Matters are
still often resolved on the courtroom steps, leading to collapsed trial
lists. In an ideal world, counsel arrive at judicial pretrials prepared
to discuss all of the issues. The pretrial takes place sufficiently in
advance of the trial date so that, if a case is resolved, there is time
to reschedule another trial. In some jurisdictions, counsel cannot
PORTTHE CURRENT CONTEXT § 4.3.3 (2014); see also NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶ 1.14.
206. See GOVT OF S. AUSTL. ATTORNEY-GEN.S DEPT, supra note 205, § 4.3.3.
207. E-mail from Amanda Forrester, supra note 197.
208. See supra Part I.C.
209. See, e.g., GAS v The Queen (2004) 217 CLR 198.
210. ONT. MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 175, at 478.
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obtain a trial date until they have had a meaningful judicial pre-
trial.
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: I would remove a lot of
the pressure to admit guilt at various stages of the process up to and
including a formal guilty plea, particularly when the defendant is
not in a position to make an informed decision. The earlier the max-
imum discount kicks in, the less likelihood of the defendant having
had legal advice or knowing the evidence against him. Our latest
guidance claims he must know the evidence against him whether he
is guilty or not, so these things are irrelevant.211
I cannot see any argument in principle for involving the prosecu-
tion in the sentencing argument, which a formal system of plea
bargaining would appear to require.
* * *
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: The process has developed over
the years to its present shape, underpinned by statute. The process
at the moment is fairly robust.
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: No changes will be truly meaningful
until Congress and some state legislatures eliminate or significantly
decrease the number of mandatory minimum sentences and three-
strikes recidivist enhancements that effectively give prosecutors the
power to sentence. This power should be returned to the judges,
whose role is to be impartial. Prosecutors, on the other hand, are
trained to be adversaries. Our country spends a great deal of time
vetting judges to ensure that they can do their jobs fairly and im-
partially. We should let judges use their skills and experience to do
what they are trained to do rather than cede that often life-changing
power to prosecutors.
211. See ATTORNEY GEN.S OFFICE, ATTORNEY GENERALS GUIDELINES ON DISCLOSURE ¶ 44
(2013) (explaining that prosecutors should disclose materials prior to a defendants entry of
a plea).
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As for the process itself, I would open it up and attempt to put the
parties on a more equal footing by:
(1) reversing the governments current policy against disclosing
impeaching and often other favorable evidence before a plea is
entered;212
(2) making pretrial diversion an option that must be considered
in all but the most violent cases;
(3) reversing the current federal policy that requires prosecutors
to file notices of prior felonies in all but the exceptional case, to
a policy that prohibits prosecutors from filing such notices in all
but the most exceptional case;213
(4) requiring federal and state departments of justice to fund
and participate in pre-entry or drug courts in every district;214
and
(5) prohibiting appellate waivers.215
212. In United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court held that defendants are not
constitutionally entitled to impeaching evidence in order to make a knowing plea. 536 U.S.
622, 629 (2002). The Court did not discuss the governments obligation to disclose other
exculpatory information prior to entry of a plea.
213. Discussed in U.S. Attorneys Manual title 9 § 9-27.300(B), the policy comes under 21
U.S.C. § 851 (2012).
214. Some federal districts across the country have created what are called pre-entry or
drug courts. These courts are intended to divert offenders from the court system altogether
by providing them with early treatment. If the treatment is successful, the charges against
the offenders are either dropped or the offenders are given the option of pleading to charges
that carry lesser penalties. See Marshanna Hester, Central Districts Federal Drug Court Aims
to Avoid Mandatory Minimum Sentences, CINEWSNOW.COM (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.
cinewsnow.com/news/local/Central-Districts-federal-drug-court-aims-to-avoid-mandatory-
minimum-sentences-219508271.html [https://perma.cc/MG9R-TPRM]; Mosi Secret, Outside
Box, Federal Judges Offer Addicts a Free Path, N.Y.TIMES (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/03/02/nyregion/us-judges-offer-addicts-a-way-to-avoid-prison.html?pagewanted%3
Dalla&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WN3Q-YFYR]. Many states, including Arizona, Georgia, North
Dakota, and West Virginia, have similar programs. See, e.g., Drug Courts, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH
(2015), http://www.azcourts.gov/apsd/Drug-Courts [https://perma.cc/2UP7-L5XB]; Program
Description, DEKALB CTY. SUPERIOR CT. (2014), http://www.dekalbsuperiorcourt.com/drug-
court/program-description [https://perma.cc/4LAT-A6NC]; Drug Court Approved, N.D. SU-
PREME CT. (Apr. 25, 2001), http://www.ndcourts.gov/_court/news/scdrugcourt.htm [https://
perma.cc/NGX6-B95G]; What Is Drug Court?, W. VA. JUDICIARY (2011), http://www.courtswv.
gov/lower-courts/adult-drug-courts/adult-drug-courts.html [https://perma.cc/8VQN-NQJG].
215. This is already the policy of the American Bar Association. See WILLIAM SHEPHERD,
AM. BAR ASSN, RESOLUTION 113E (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
directories/policy/2013_hod_annual_meeting_113E.docx [https://perma.cc/BZ7A-4MTX].
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I. Case Processing
Could you give a sense of the case processing that goes on in
your nation?
In the United States, the push for bargainingat least initial-
lywas that the whole criminal justice system would be over-
whelmed if there were not such negotiated resolutions because of
the mass of trials being handled. Here we were trying to determine
the situation if the number of felony cases coming up for trial in a
particular system were much more limited; in short, is there
another rationale for the process?
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: Each Australian jurisdiction
has a Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) whose office is generally
responsible for prosecuting indictable offenses216 that are prosecuted
in the superior courts.217 All prosecutions commence in lower courts
(magistrates or local courts), and indictable matters that cannot be
dealt with summarily (or, in the case of either way offenses, which
are committed to a superior court in any event) will be committed
to a superior court. Depending on the jurisdiction, the DPP may
assume conduct of the case while it is still in the lower court, but in
all cases will have conduct of the matter once committed. When the
DPP is involved in the lower court, negotiations may occur prior to
committal, and on occasion may result in a matter being dealt with
summarily after the charge is downgraded. Often, however, plea ne-
gotiations will occur when an accused has pleaded not guilty and
has been committed for trial, and usually after substantial, if not
216. These encompass the more serious offenses in each jurisdiction.
217. The Superior Courts are the Supreme Court and District (or County) Court of each
State and Territory, and the Federal Court in the Commonwealth jurisdiction. Plea nego-
tiations also occur in courts of summary jurisdiction (magistrates courts) in respect to nonin-
dictable offenses or either way offenses that remain in the summary court. In such cases,
police prosecutors or lawyers employed by police departments or DPP offices will conduct the
prosecution. Case management of summary prosecutions is generally not as structured or
complex as it is for prosecutions on indictment, and prosecutors in summary courts often will
not have a brief until a short time before a hearing. Consequently, any plea negotiation is
more likely to be instigated by the defense.
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full, disclosure of evidentiary material has been made by the
prosecution to the defense.218
Western Australia is the fourth largest of the state jurisdictions.
Numbers in the larger states will be significantly greater, but West-
ern Australian statistics would be indicative of general trends. In
the 2013-2014 financial year, there were 1936 matters committed
to the superior courts, but the number of open cases for that period
was 2910.219 Of the 1936 committals, 57 percent (1104 matters) were
committed for sentence (that is, after a plea of guilty was en-
tered).220 Of those, 53 percent (582 matters) were pleas of guilty on
the fast track system, the defendant having pleaded at the earliest
opportunity, without the need for full disclosure of the prosecutions
evidence.221 Of the other 47 percent of matters committed for
sentence, some of the guilty pleas may have resulted from negotia-
tions, but there is no statistic available for that eventuality. Of the
43 percent of matters committed for trial, some would subsequently
change to pleas of guilty, some would be discontinued, and some
would proceed to trial, but the statistical models of the Office of the
Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) for Western Australia do not
provide figures for those outcomes related to committals.222 The
ODPPs numbers show, however, that in 2013-2014, 766 matters
were listed for trial, of which only 399 actually proceeded to a
concluded trial.223 Of those that did not proceed to a concluded trial,
there were 21 cases where the defendant pleaded guilty during the
trial and 317 listings that were vacated before the trial date.224 In
135 of those, the defendant pleaded guilty, and of those pleas, 25 are
recorded as being the result of negotiations, although it is possible
the number was greater.225
218. See, e.g., NSW LRC, supra note 5, at ¶ 2.4.
219. This statistical data is not public but was made available with kind permission from
the electronic case management system of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
(ODPP) for Western Australia on June 30, 2014. Some of the data is available in the ODPPs
annual report. See generally OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS FOR THE STATE OF
W. AUSTL., 2013/2014 ANNUAL REPORT 20, http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/_files/ODPP_Annual_
Report_2013_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DCC-DS7S].
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
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In terms of sheer number, 766 listed trials may be small in com-
parison to many other jurisdictions. Still, with regard to the number
of available judges and prosecutors in Western Australia, and the
size of the community, it is generally accepted here that if all mat-
ters that were committed for trial were to proceed, it would take
considerably longer for matters to get to trial than the current
average timeframe of six to twelve months. The rationale for plea
negotiations in Australia, however, is multifaceted, as discussed
above. Avoiding delay is one facet.
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: Again, this will depend on the
Canadian jurisdiction in issue.
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: Over the last twenty
years or so, we have seen the emergence of an administration-
centred management ethos engaged in inventing new ways to pro-
cess large numbers of criminals or suspected criminals at minimal
cost.226 It is clear, as I wrote recently, that in England and Wales,
the criminal justice system has reeled under the weight of new
criminal offences ... created by successive Labour governments, and
the constant stream of reform to criminal procedures and sentencing
powers.227 In the face of system overload, governments have chosen
not to fund the criminal process so that it can both cope with
caseload and preserve traditional safeguards. [J]udges are now re-
quired to intervene proactively in the management of criminal cases
before and during trial, to encourage agreement where possible and
to ensure that trials begin promptly, are as narrowly focused as
possible, and do not last longer than necessary.228
* * *
226. McEwan, supra note 198, at 519-22.
227. Id. at 521.
228. Id. at 527.
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New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: The Criminal Procedure Act,
enacted in 2011, is new and is very process oriented.229 There are
time limits fixed for stages in the process to trial.230 A sentence in-
dication stops the clock.231 The sentence indication process was
originally conceived to offer an encouragement to those whose guilt
could be proved to plead at an early stage. Credit and discounts are
available for an early guilty plea.232 I cannot say that the system
cannot do without sentence indications, but there can be no doubt
that meritless cases would clog the system.
Let me explain the credits and discounts that are available for an
early guilty plea. This requires a discussion of the provisions of the
Sentencing Act, which sets out the principles and purposes of sen-
tencing and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that are
to be taken into account. As a result of a number of appeal deci-
sions, the sentencing process has become a very process-driven
exercise and, in some respects, almost a mathematical one. It works
something like this:
(1) Identification of circumstances surrounding the offense, in-
cluding aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the offense
itself.233 Mitigating circumstances of the offence may be, for ex-
ample, in the case of a group assault, where the accused stood on
the sidelines and offered verbal encouragement rather than be-
coming physically involved.
(2) Identification of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
personal to the accused. This could include matters such as pre-
vious convictions (aggravating circumstances) or expressions of
remorse (mitigating circumstances).234
At the end of this stage of the process, the judge is required to set
a starting point for the sentencing exercise.235 If an accused has
229. See generally Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.).
230. Id. at pts 2-3.
231. Id. at s 64.
232. See Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(2)(b) (N.Z.).
233. See id. s 9(1)-(2).
234. See id.
235. The requirement for judges to set a starting point in sentencing is set out in R v
Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 (CA), and R v Clifford [2011] NZCA 360. There is no authority that
suggests that the same process must be followed for sentence indications. Some judges, in-
cluding this author, articulate the basis for a sentence indication including the fixing of
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previous convictions for similar offenses, the starting point may
have an additional uplift;236 thus, for example, a person accused of
assault with intent to injure may have a starting point fixed of two
and a half years together with an additional six months for previous
similar offending as an uplift.
Once the starting point has been identified, various reductions
may come into play, including factors such as the youth of the ac-
cused, previous good conduct, efforts to engage in self-rehabilitation,
statements of remorse, and the like.237 Various deductions from the
starting point will then be made.
The effect of the guilty plea is then taken into account. The closer
the guilty plea is to the trial date, the less reduction will be given.
Essentially, a guilty plea at the earliest opportunity will attract a
discount of anything between 20 and 25 percent.238 A guilty plea
close to trial may attract a discount of between 10 and 15 percent
only.239
All of these factors, including the various discounts, are taken
into account in the sentencing indication process. Depending on how
early in the process the sentencing indication is being given, it may
mean that the discount for an early guilty plea could be quite signif-
icant.
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: The answer to this question sheds light
on why plea bargaining is so pervasive in this country.
(1) The imprisonment rate in the United States exceeds that of
any other Western democracy.240
starting points along with aggravating and mitigating features and the various applicable
discounts.
236. See Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(1)(j) (N.Z.); Reedy v Police [2015] NZHC 1069 at [15]
(Parliament expressly authorises the treatment of previous convictions as aggravating
factors in assessing offending.).
237. See Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(1)-(2) (N.Z.).
238. See, e.g., Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135.
239. See id.
240. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 2 (2014), http://
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_Fact_sheet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8ZD5-67XS]. Nonetheless, the good news is that in the past few years we have seen
our incarceration rate begin to decrease. Incarceration, SENTG PROJECT, http://www.
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(2) The War on Drugs and the War on Crime resulted in a tor-
rent of new federal and state criminal statutes: three-strikes and
other recidivist laws, higher maximum sentences, mandatory
minimum sentences, and the creation of the federal sentencing
guidelines.241 These initiatives in turn resulted in dramatic in-
creases in the length of sentences and in a 500 percent increase
in the U.S. prison population over the past thirty years.242 There
are currently 2.2 million persons in prisons and jails in the
United States, making it the worlds leader in incarceration, at
least as to nations reporting such information.243
(3) As noted earlier, in recent years Congress has enacted a
proliferation of federal criminal law[s] ... that lack adequate
mens rea requirements and are vague in defining the conduct
that they criminalize.244
In sum, over the past three decades we have seen skyrocketing
rates of imprisonment, increasingly lengthy sentences, an influx of
mandatory minimum sentences, a wealth of new criminal statutes,
and a decreasing number of criminal statutes requiring proof of
intent. All of this is true under federal law; it is sadly also true in
many states.
sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107 [https://perma.cc/YK24-W4A7]. A recent not-
able illustration of this trend was the decision of the U.S. Sentencing Commission to cut the
sentences of 46,000 inmates serving time for drug offenses. See Timothy M. Phelps, Federal
Government Moves to Reduce Sentences of 46,000 Drug Offenders, CHI. TRIB. (July 18, 2014,
11:10 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/la-na-drug-sentences-reduced-20140718-
story.html [https://perma.cc/F6W6-QGGP].
241. According to a bipartisan group of legal experts, the number of federal crimes has
grown so large that it ensnares everyday citizens who have no idea they are violating the
law. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Criminal Code Is Overgrown, Legal Experts Tell
Panel, WALLST.J. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204
336104577096852004601924 [https://perma.cc/JC6Y-M2NJ]. Former AttorneyGeneral Edwin
Meese estimates there are now about 4500 federal criminal statutes and over 300,000 other
regulations that carry criminal penalties. Id.
242. Incarceration, supra note 240.
243. Id. See generally NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL
PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 1-9 (2014),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WJ6-MXWJ].
244. BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND., WITHOUT INTENT: HOW
CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW 1-2 (2010), http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/05/without-intent [https://perma.cc/6U6G-Z4Q3].
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J. The Views of Defense Lawyers
Do you think that defense lawyers believe plea bargaining can
achieve fair results? How do defense lawyers feel about a system in
which the majority of cases are not tried, and in which prosecutors
and judges have great power?
Not surprisingly, once again our participants viewpoints differ
considerably. For example, our long-term Australia prosecuting
attorney has a very different viewpoint from our experienced U.S.
defense lawyer.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: I think that, in general terms,
defense lawyers in Australia regard plea negotiations as essential
to achieving fair results when their client admits some criminal
responsibility.245 They can negotiate on the basis of the instructions
they have received to achieve the best result for the defendant in
terms of the charges and agreed facts, knowing that a suitable res-
olution without trial is highly desirable to the prosecution and the
courts. The independence of the prosecution services in Australia
means there is no political consequence to decisions made appropri-
ately and in accordance with the law. Thus, defense lawyers can
approach negotiations with the expectation that the matter will be
considered by the prosecutor on its merits without the influence of
any external pressures. Ultimately, of course, sentencing is a matter
for the judge, who exercises independent judgment. The fairness of
the sentence can be challenged on appeal, if issue is taken.
To the extent that concerns have been raised about the fairness
of the process, they relate to the pressure that some defendants may
feel to plead guilty,246 whether financial, or stemming from an in-
ability to face the stress of a trial, or from fear of a greater penalty
if convicted after trial. In my opinion, however, such pressures do
not reflect on the plea negotiation process itself. The process pro-
245. The research conducted by Asher Flynn, supra note 93, at 205, refers to comments by
defense lawyers who indicated they believed fair outcomes can be achieved.
246. Id. at 101.
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vides a reasonable opportunity to the guilty who wish to negotiate
the charges and facts to achieve a fairer reflection of their conduct,
as they believe it to be.
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: In the past, some defense law-
yers were reluctant to offer the kind of information required of them
at a judicial pretrial. It was said that the defense need not disclose
its strategy until the trial. There was some reluctance to give up the
element of surprise.
Now, most defense counsel accept that the process can work only
if they are willing to speak about the case for the defense. It is
recognized that this disclosure often inures to the benefit of the
accused person, as the strength of the defenses position may ulti-
mately persuade the Crown to reconsider its approach.
That said, the potential coercive effect of plea discussions is a
matter of concern. This concern has increased in Canada as we have
seen the introduction of new mandatory minimum sentences in our
Criminal Code and other federal statutes. In an earlier paper, I
offered the following comments:
[Plea discussions and] mandatory minimum sentences may
create a coercive environment that encourages false pleas of
guiltpleas entered by persons who are not guilty of the offence.
This may happen where the Crown offers to take a plea to a
lesser offence, one that does not carry a minimum penalty. The
disparity between the sentence offered on a plea and that
guaranteed on conviction may create an unhealthy inducement,
as when a person who faces a minimum five year term upon
conviction is offered 12 months on a plea to a lesser offence....
Tragically, we have seen cases in Canada in which innocent
persons have pleaded guilty to serious crimes, only to be later
exonerated.
Part of the difficulty is that a single party to the litiga-
tionthe Crownhas control over the charge that appears on
the indictment, as well as the charge that might be substituted
on a plea of guilt. The effect of a mandatory minimum regime is,
not only to remove discretion from the judiciary, but to download
that discretion to the prosecution service. Through plea resolu-
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tion discussions, the Crown has authority to determine whether
an offender should or should not be subject to a statutorily pre-
scribed minimum. An election to proceed by way of indictment
may mean that the offender faces a minimum sentence of one
year upon conviction, rather than a minimum sentence of 90
days. That election will, in most cases, foreclose consideration of
a conditional sentence. The Crowns willingness or unwillingness
to accept a plea to a lesser offence will have profound implica-
tions. The Crown will have enormous bargaining power in plea
resolution discussions and significant tactical advantage.
This is not to say that prosecutorial discretion is a bad thing.
To the contrary, it is a necessary component of the criminal
justice system and, exercised properly, promotes fairness and
justice. The Crown is a quasi-judicial officer and bound by
special obligations and duties associated with that role. The
presumption is that the Crown will honour those duties in
exercising its discretionary powers. The problem is not that the
Crown has discretion; the problem is that the Crown is the only
one with discretion. The Crown has the discretion to oust
judicial discretion by proceeding on a charge with a minimum
sentence. The determination of a fit and appropriate sentence,
having regard to all of the circumstances of the offence and
offender, may be determined in plea discussions outside of the
courtroom by a party to the litigation. Where the offence calls for
a minimum sentence, the judge as final arbiter is emascu-
lated.247
In the recent case of R. v. Nur, the Supreme Court of Canada,
striking down a mandatory minimum sentence for a firearms of-
fense, commented on the difficulties that flow when all meaningful
discretion is vested in the prosecutor:
This leads to a related concern that vesting that much power in
the hands of prosecutors endangers the fairness of the criminal
process. It gives prosecutors a trump card in plea negotiations,
which leads to an unfair power imbalance with the accused and
creates an almost irresistible incentive for the accused to plead
to a lesser sentence in order to avoid the prospect of a lengthy
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. As a result, the de-
247. Renee Pomerance, The New Approach to Sentencing in Canada: Reflections of a Trial
Judge, 17 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 305, 312-13 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
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termination of a fit and appropriate sentence, having regard to
all of the circumstances of the offence and offender, may be de-
termined in plea discussions outside of the courtroom by a party
to the litigation[.] We cannot ignore the increased possibility
that wrongful convictions could occur under such conditions.
Second, ... the exercise of discretion typically occurs before the
facts are fully known. An analysis that upholds [section] 95(2) on
the basis of the summary conviction option does not come to
grips with the timing of the Crown election and the factual basis
upon which that election is made[.] The existence of the
summary conviction option is therefore not an answer to the
respondents s. 12 claim. As stated in R. v. Smickle, 2012 ONSC
602 (CanLII), 110 O.R. (3d) 25, at para. 110: The Crown
discretion is exercised at an early stage when all of the facts,
particularly those favourable to the defence, are often not
known. Often, the full facts will not be known until the trial
judge delivers his or her reasons or the jury delivers a verdict.248
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: I have a strong concern
here. The only evidence I have of defense lawyers take on the stric-
tures from courts to remind defendants about pleading guilty, partly
because of concern about new case management rules and client
confidentiality, is a comment from a solicitor interviewed for some
research:
The Court Clerk turns to me and sayshas your client been
advised as to the credit he will get if he pleads guilty?because
thats what the Criminal Procedural Rules say that the court
have got to ask me. My answer isask him yourself. I am not
going to answer that question, because if I had spoken to my
client about something thats professionally privileged, you
cant ask me.249
* * *
248. R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, paras. 96-97 (Can.) (some citations omitted).
249. Fae Garland & Jenny McEwan, Embracing the Overriding Objective: Difficulties and
Dilemmas in the New Criminal Climate, 16 INTL J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 233, 247-48 (2012).
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New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: Prosecutors in New Zealand
are amenable to persuasion when it comes to overcharging and will
reduce charges to a more realistic level after discussion with coun-
sel. I would say that overcharging is rare at least in my experience.
My son, who is at the defense bar, may disagree, but he has a high
success rate in getting charges reduced. Occasionally judges will
intervene, generally at case review hearings where it is obvious that
there has been overcharging. This depends very much upon the ju-
dicial style, and I must say that it is unusual for overcharging to
take place. My son generally is able to persuade prosecutors to
reduce charges when there is clear overcharging, and it is generally
within that context that charges are reduced. It is therefore unusual
for a judge to become involved in an overcharging inquiry.
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: Sometimes. I do think it depends on
what kinds of offenses we are talking about and which defendants
we are talking about. For poor people of color, fair results are much
harder to come by, not because of deliberate racial prejudice, but
rather because our criminal justice system is so stacked against
poor people, and especially poor people of color.250 No matter how
you look at it, the numbers are staggering. Just one example:
[B]lack males have a 32% chance of serving time in prison at some
point in their lives; Hispanic males a 17% chance; white males have
a 6% chance.251 By the time I see my client in the lockup, he (most
of my clients are men) probably has already been arrested several
times, probably convicted once or twice for minor crimes, maybe
served some short sentences, maybe had some serious psychological
or substance abuse problems that went untreated, and now we are
in federal court looking at serious time.252
250. See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J.
2176, 2180, 2182-85 (2013).
251. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACTS ABOUT PRISONS AND PEOPLE IN PRISONS 1 (2014),
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Facts%20About%20Prisons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D5G9-7RR9].
252. A good example of how all these disparities ratchet up the consequences for people of
color can be found in United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (D. Mass. 1998). In that
case, the court reviewed the defendants prior record and discovered that it contained a
number of traffic offenses. See id. The court concluded: By counting the imprisonment that
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K. The Views of Judges
Within your country, do judges themselves take disparate views
on the merits of plea bargaining and the role that the judge should
play in such discussions?
What major differences we see here. Judges in New Zealand, op-
erating under their recent comprehensive statutory overhaul,
appear to be of a single mind in applying that scheme. In Canada,
however, judges may view their roles quite differently depending on
the individual and the part of the nation in which that individual
sits.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: The cases referred to earlier
tend to suggest that judges have taken different views.253 The High
Court decisions make it clear that a judge has no role in the plea
negotiation process and cannot reject a negotiated plea unless it
amounts to an abuse of process.254 Such an instance may be when
the plea is inconsistent with the facts or evidence on which the
judge is asked to rely for sentencing.255
Although the judge must accept the plea if it is open on the facts
presented, he or she is not precluded from expressing a critical
opinion about the resolution, and they sometimes do, particularly
the defendant has received for the prior offenses, the system effectively replicates disparities
in sentencing in the state system. This would include not only the ordinary disparities
between similarly situated defendants, but racial disparities. See id. (footnote omitted). The
most recent study makes the same point:
Even after controlling for factors like the seriousness of the charges and a
defendants criminal history, blacks and Latinos were more likely than whites
to be denied bail and more likely to be offered a harsher plea deal involving time
behind bars. Blacks were also slightly more likely to be sentenced to prison than
whites. When the charge was a misdemeanor drug offense, black defendants
were 27 percent more likely than whites to get a plea offer that included
incarceration.
Editorial, How Race Skews Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2014, at A18; see also Tracey
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 341-53 (1998).
253. See GAS v The Queen (2004) 217 CLR 198, 198 (Austl.); Maxwell v The Queen (1996)
184 CLR 501, 510-15 (Austl.).
254. See Maxwell, 184 CLR at 514.
255. See id. at 504.
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if the charges do not adequately reflect the criminality that may
appear from the evidence.256 However, this is not so much an indi-
cation of an opinion about the process as it is about the particular
outcome in the case.257
The same may be said of comments of courts of appeal in the
various jurisdictions (including Western Australia) that have been
critical of concessions that have been made about the factual basis
for sentencing in individual cases.258 The context tends to be when
a convicted offender appeals his or her sentence and relies on the
compromised factual basis as a ground for arguing that the sentence
was manifestly excessive.259 One could regard the courts comments
in such cases as providing guidance to the prosecution as to its
proper role in such matters for future negotiations.
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: There are disparate views held
by judges throughout Canada. Please reference my reflections in
Part I.A.
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: The McKinnon case is
helpful here.260 I am referring to the horror expressed by some
judges, including the Court of Appeal in the same case, at the idea
of the U.S. system;261 but the judgment in the House of Lords sug-
gested that it is not that alarming, so maybe attitudes are soften-
ing.262 My guess is that most judges would hate to be involved in the
process, but I have no evidence of that.
* * *
256. See id. at 511 (citing R v Martin (1904) 21 WN 233, 235 (N.S.W.)).
257. See id.
258. See id. at 513-14 (citing R v Brown (1989) 17 NSWLR 472, 479-80).
259. See id.
260. See McKinnon v. United States [2008] 1 WLR 1739 (HL) 1742 (Eng.).
261. See id. at 1749-50.
262. See id. at 1749.
1212 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1147
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: There are a few judges who,
before the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act came into effect,
would not engage with the sentence indication process.263 I am un-
aware now of the position, but I can say that for all of the judgesat
least in the region of New Zealand within which I work, Auckland
there is no reluctance to engage with the sentencing indication
process. This is especially so now that it has been given statutory
validation and is seen by most judges as an important part of the
criminal justice process.264
Having said that, I cannot say that judges enter the arena, roll up
their sleeves, and actively broker resolutions as in some nations, but
judges surely do get involved in the process and there certainly is
no suggestion that it is an unseemly undertaking.
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: I think it is fair to say that all federal
and state judges believe there is a need for plea bargaining in our
criminal justice system. How their views differ is on whether too
many cases today involve plea bargaining and whether the prosecu-
tion has been given too much power in the plea-bargaining process.
As for the role judges should play, U.S. judges are used to re-
maining outside the fray in plea bargaining, although they are
certainly active in the settlement of civil cases. Whether many
would choose, if they could, to become more involved in the process
is unknown to me, and is, surely, most controversial.
L. Strategies to Induce Guilty Pleas
Are you seeing system strategies designed to persuade defendants
to plead guilty, aside from the issue of whether there is a formal
process of plea bargaining?
A system involving widespread plea bargaining will almost inev-
itably place pressure on defense counsel to recommend a clients
participation in the negotiation, or that client may suffer serious
263. See Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.).
264. See id.
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negative consequences. The range in views we see here, however, as
to such pressure is quite pronounced.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: Most jurisdictions have legis-
lative provisions recognizing the mitigatory value of a plea of guilty;
some are more prescriptive than others.265 In Western Australia,
section 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 formalizes the discount to
be given for the utilitarian value of pleas of guiltythat is, to re-
cognise the benefits to the State, and to any victim of or witness to
the offence.266 The amount of the discount must be stated by the
sentencing judge.267 Common law principles relating to discounts for
mitigating factors associated with pleas of guilty, including genuine
remorse and assistance given to investigating and prosecuting
agencies, still apply,268 and can result in significantly greater reduc-
tions than the maximum 25 percent provided for in section 9AA for
a plea entered at the first reasonable opportunity.269
I have earlier referred to concerns that have been raised about
the pressures that defendants may feel to plead guilty in a system
that rewards such pleas with discounts.270 Critics here, as else-
where, regard such systems as impinging on the right to trial, and
a test of a defendants resolve to resist pleading guilty, irrespective
of whether he or she is guilty or innocent.271 I am not aware of any
study, however, that suggests the inducement of innocent defen-
dants into pleading guilty is a real problem. On the other hand, it
is clear from the statistics I have referred to above that a significant
number of defendants who ultimately plead guilty leave it to a late
265. See NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶¶ 9.27-.35 (describing sentencing discounts for guilty
pleas in various jurisdictions).
266. Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 9AA(2) (Austl.).
267. Id. s 9AA(5).
268. See NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶¶ 9.23-.24, 9.30.
269. See Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 9AA(4)(b) (Austl.).
270. See Asher Flynn & Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Bargaining with Defensive Homicide: Examining
Victorias Secretive Plea-Bargaining System Post-Law Reform, 35 MELB. U.L.REV. 905, 915-16
(2011).
271. See id.
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stage to do so, often after a matter has been listed for trial.272
Incentives to plead guilty at an early stage are a legitimate measure
to reduce wastage of resources and the deleterious effects of pro-
longed proceedings.273
Two Australian states have previously implemented sentence
indication schemes by statute. Under those schemes a defendant
can request from the court an indication of the penalty he or she is
likely to receive before pleading guilty to an offense. The scheme in
New South Wales was implemented in 1992 and was discontinued
four years later on evidence that it did not increase court efficiencies
or the rate of guilty pleas.274 A sentence indication scheme was im-
plemented in Victoria in 2007 and continues to be in effect.275
Court-supervised case conferencing has been tried in New South
Wales, Victoria, and Western Australia.276 The New South Wales
trial was discontinued following a review which suggested [the
schemes] were not increasing the rate of early guilty pleas.277 In
Western Australia, the plan, which operates in the Supreme Court,
is supported by a Practice Direction.278 It has functioned mainly as
a means of narrowing the issues that are in contention and the evi-
dence that will be required at trial.279 It has led to resolution by the
entering of pleas of guilty to the charges or alternative charges in
some cases.280 As part of a system of combined measures in the Su-
preme Court, it has been considered to be a success in resolving
cases without the need for trial and reducing the length of trials.281
272. See NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶ 1.6 (35% of all guilty pleas were submitted after the
matter had been committed for trial and, most tellingly, of these approximately 61% occurred
on the day of trial.) (footnotes omitted).
273. See id. ¶¶ 1.7-.8.
274. NSW LRC, supra note 5, at 113.
275. See VICT. SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, SENTENCE INDICATION AND SPECIFIED SEN-
TENCEDISCOUNTSFINALREPORT 27-29 (2007), https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/
default/files/publication-documents/Sentence%20Indication%20and%20Specified%
20Sentence%20Discounts%20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUB5-743X].
276. See NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶¶ 5.1-.47.
277. Id. at 71.
278. Id. ¶¶ 5.14-.15.
279. See id. ¶ 5.16.
280. Id. ¶ 5.23.
281. Id. ¶ 5.24.
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The system in Victoria is also reported as having been successful in
assisting to achieve resolutions by increased pleas of guilty.282
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: A plea of guilt is a mitigating
factor on sentence.283 It is evidence of remorse and will often operate
to reduce the offenders sentence.284 The earlier the plea, the more
mitigating its effect.285 On the other hand, if there is a mandatory
minimum sentence, this will remove much of the judges discretion
to award credit for a guilty plea.286 In some cases, the incentive to
plead guilty will realistically be gone, as the sentence imposed on a
plea will not be very different from the sentence imposed after a
trial.287
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: This mainly relates to
sentencing, as explained, plus courts being required to ensure the
defendant has been reminded of the sentencing discount.288 The
more often the defendant is told about the advantages of a guilty
plea, the more pressure he is under. And under new procedures, he
is required in the magistrates court to enter a plea irrespective of
whether he has had prosecution disclosure or legal advice.289 So if he
282. See generally VICT.SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, SENTENCE INDICATION: A REPORT
ON THE PILOT SCHEME ¶ 3.36 (2010), http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/default/
files/publication-documents/Sentence%20Indication%20A%20Report%20on%20the%20Pilot%
20Scheme.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AYQ-L99G].
283. See Criminal Code, R.S.Q., c C-46, s 725(1)(b) (Can.).
284. See id.
285. See R. v. Conlon, [2011] ABPC 259 (Can. Alta.)
286. See Pomerance, supra note 247, at 312.
287. See id.
288. See SENTENCINGGUIDELINES COUNCIL,MAGISTRATESCOURTSENTENCINGGUIDELINES
18b-c (2012).
289. Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, § 46 (Eng.); see also LORD JUSTICE LEVESON,
ESSENTIAL CASE MANAGEMENT: APPLYING THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULES (2009), https://
www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Protocols/applying-crim-procedure-
rules-dec-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/F38R-BV7Y] (explaining that [a]t every hearing (how-
ever early) ... the court must take the defendants plea, and that the courts obligation does
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pleads not guilty while he waits for this to happen, he will lose the
discount, and the magistrates will tell him that.
* * *
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: This country over the last
couple of years has seen some dramatic changes to the legal aid sys-
tem; although, having said that, the Public Defence Service was also
developed, which now has offices in most of the main centers of the
country.290 Public defenders are not under any constraint to broker
guilty pleas, and their primary duty is to the client.291
Having said that, at the case review stage of the progress of a
case to trial, some judges will become quite active in terms of con-
sidering the case faced by an accused person and carefully ask
questions about the issues that are in contest in the case. Some
judges will not unquestioningly accept a suggestion that all matters
are at issue, although my practice is to recognize that such a state-
ment effectively means that the prosecution is being put to the
proof. Having regard to the principle of the presumption of inno-
cence, no contest can be taken with this, although other judges I
know do not share my view and will carefully question the accused
about the issues in a case. I consider myself an activist judge in
trying to reach resolution but not at the expense of the presumption
of innocence.
It is my experience that self-represented accused are more likely
than not to maintain a not-guilty plea often on the basis of principle,
or when they feel there has been some wrong done to them by pro-
secuting authorities, or where they merely want to have an
opportunity to tell their story.
not depend on the extent of advance information, service of evidence, disclosure of unused
material, or the grant of legal aid).
290. See Public Defence Service History and Expansion, N.Z. MINISTRY JUST., http://www.
justice.govt.nz/services/legal-help/legal-aid/public-defence-service/about/history [https://perma.
cc/7CH5-XQ27] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
291. See About the Public Defence Service, N.Z. MINISTRY JUST., http://www.justice.govt.nz/
services/legal-help/legal-aid/public-defence-service/about [https://perma.cc/E8AE-L6S3] (last
visited Mar. 20, 2016).
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* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: Yes. Many systemic pressures come to
bear here. First, within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines them-
selves, defendants receive points off (the equivalent of time off) for
acceptance of responsibility.292 The decision whether to give those
points off depends on whether the judge believes the defendant sin-
cerely accepts responsibility.293 A defendant who goes to trial will
almost never be given those points off, regardless of whether the
defendant testifies at trial.294
A third point off is also available under the Guidelines, but only
to defendants who fully disclose the extent of their conduct to the
government and agree to plead guilty in time for the government to
avoid having to prepare for trial and permit the government and
the court to allocate their resources efficiently.295
The Guidelines also give points off for substantial assistance,
or in other words, cooperation.296 If the government determines that
the defendant substantially assisted the government in its investi-
gation, it may file a motion stating that fact, and the court must
consider the assistance in sentencing the defendant.297
Most significantly, if the prosecutor has charged the defendant
with counts that carry mandatory minimum sentences, in most
cases the court may sentence below the mandatory minimums only
if the government files a motion stating the defendant has cooper-
ated fully and specifically requesting that the court sentence below
the mandatory minimum.298
In addition, because the risk of conviction at trial and the sen-
tences that follow are both exceedingly high, many defendants
292. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMMN 2014).
293. See id. § 3E1.1. cmt. 5.
294. See id. § 3E1.1. cmt. 2.
295. Id. § 3E1.1(b).
296. Id. § 5K1.1.
297. See id.
298. In a smaller number of cases, in which offenders with minimal criminal histories are
accused of being minimally involved in nonviolent offenses, the court may sentence below the
mandatory minimum if all other statutory criteria are met. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f ) (2012).
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choose to plead guilty to minimize the risk of serving lengthy prison
sentences.299
M. Trends
In your country are there trends or directions in systems toward
both formal structure and the plea of guilty, changes not found in
the past?
Once again in reviewing responses to a basic question, we see a
wide range of views.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: The NSW LRC inquiry provides
a snapshot of directions that have been taken and some proposed to
be taken in New South Wales.300 They are discussed above. They do
not include formalizing plea negotiations as such, apart from the
use of case conferencing as a means of facilitating discussions.301
Moreover, they are not new directions.302 They have been found in
the past.303 Some have been abandoned and are now being reconsid-
ered.304 Victoria, too, has made major changes, as discussed above.305
These states include our two largest metropolitan areas: Sydney and
Melbourne. What is certain is that all jurisdictions in Australia
continue to regard early resolution of criminal cases as an ideal
worth pursuing, for reasons previously discussed.306
299. Human Rights Watch has documented cases that illustrate the unjust sentences that
result from a dangerous combination of unfettered prosecutorial power and egregiously severe
sentencing laws. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 199, at 2. The report finds that in
fact plea agreements have for all intents and purposes become an offer drug defendants
cannot afford to refuse. Id.
300. NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶¶ 9.27-.28.
301. See id. ¶¶ 5.1-.12.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id. ¶¶ 5.45, 9.41.
305. See id. ¶¶ 9.27-.28.
306. See id. ¶ 1.2.
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* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: In Canada, we have for many
years had good reason to be concerned about delay in criminal
matters. When cases are not tried within a reasonable time, for
purposes of section 11(b) of the Charter, they must be stayed.307
In 2012, new provisions in the Criminal Code provide for case
management judges who can manage mega-trials and make rul-
ings that will be binding at trial, even if there is a different trial
judge.308 This was seen as an additional arrow in the quiver for man-
aging long, difficult, and time-consuming cases.
In some instances, this type of management will lead to earlier
resolutions.
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: Recent developments
include the attitude adjustment in McKinnon,309 the Attorney
Generals Guidelines regarding serious fraud,310 the Goodyear de-
cision (discussed in McKinnon),311 and the emphasis on early
pleas.312
* * *
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: Certainly the Criminal Pro-
cedure Act introduces a formalized structure to the criminal trial
process by setting time limits for various stages of the process.
Some judges require strict adherence to time limits and require a
plea upon second appearance even when disclosure has not been
307. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11(b) (U.K.).
308. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 §§ 551.1-551.6 (Can.).
309. McKinnon v. United States [2008] 1 WLR 1739 (HL) 1742 (Eng.).
310. See ATTORNEY GEN.S OFFICE, supra note 57, ¶¶ D1-D13 (laying out plea bargaining
procedure for cases involving fraud charges).
311. See McKinnon, 1 WLR at 1749 (citing R v. Goodyear [2005] 1 WLR 2532 (Eng.)).
312. See Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, § 144 (Eng.)
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complete. I am not one of them and believe that a plea can be enter-
ed only once proper information has been received and when proper
advice based upon that information has been given. The evaluation
of the strength of a prosecutions case, in my view, cannot be made
when information is incomplete or insufficient. More of the new ap-
pointees to the bench are process driven, probably because they
have grown up in that environment.
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: Happily, yes. There have been well-
publicized discussions on just this point.313 One federal judge this
past year suggested that the role of prosecutors in plea bargaining
be diminished and mandatory minimum sentences be eliminated.314
Recognizing that both of these solutions are politically unlikely, he
suggested a third, more radical, possibilitythat judges other than
those assigned to a case be allowed to work with the prosecution
and defense as mediators or evaluators in negotiating plea agree-
ments.315
Also, as discussed earlier, numerous state and federal offices have
begun working with courts to create pre-entry or drug courts to di-
vert some persons from the criminal justice system altogether.316
In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice has launched a com-
prehensive review of the criminal justice system in order to identify
reforms that would ensure federal laws are enforced more fairly
andin an era of reduced budgetsmore efficiently.317 As part of
its reform effort, the Attorney General said: The reality is, while
the aggressive enforcement of federal criminal statutes remains
necessary, we cannot prosecute our way to becoming a safer nation.
To be effective, federal efforts must also focus on prevention and
313. See Gilien Silsby, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, USC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2014),
https://news.usc.edu/61662/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty [https://perma.cc/94PL-N4KJ]
(describing the Honorable Jed Rakoff s speech given at the University of Southern California).
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
317. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2013).
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reentry. In addition, it is time to rethink the nations system of mass
imprisonment.318 He went on to endorse alternatives to incarcera-
tion, including drug courts and other pretrial diversion programs,
as well as a new policy that will limit when the government can
invoke mandatory minimum sentences.319
N. Ending Plea Bargaining?
Could your nation, as some have suggested, just do away with
plea bargaining? Would it be wise, would it be workable?
No one, of course, really knows the answer to the latter question,
though in several nations the answer has typically beenas ex-
pressed in the English viewthat the system is just too much relied
upon, and too heavily used, to simply reject it now. The wisdom of
the plea bargaining practice, however, is another matter entirely, as
our readers will see by looking at the five responses below.
* * *
Australia, Hon. Justice Fiannaca: Plea negotiations are part of a
multifaceted approach to achieving criminal justice ideals, includ-
ing early resolution of cases and a fair disposition of matters that
adequately serves the communitys need to bring offenders to jus-
tice.320 The impact on the system of removing one facet from the
equation is difficult to estimate. The expectation in my jurisdiction,
however, is that it would result in additional matters going to trial
and unreasonable delays in bringing cases to conclusion.321 For rea-
sons discussed above, this is undesirable for all parties.322
In my opinion, it would not be wise for prosecution services to
cease engaging with defense counsel to arrive at appropriate, prin-
cipled resolutions. It is entrenched as part of the management of
318. See id.
319. See id. at 3-4.
320. NSW LRC, supra note 5, ¶¶ 1.5-.9.
321. See id.
322. See id.
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criminal cases. In my experience, and that of my colleagues in
Western Australia, the key is to adhere to the guidelines, to make
decisions based on reason rather than expedience, and to be con-
sultative, ensuring victims and investigating officers are kept in-
formed and the process is explained. Investigating officers will gen-
erally agree with decisions that are made, and victims will generally
accept such decisions, appreciating that they too benefit from the
certainty of a conviction and avoidance of the trauma of a trial. The
relatively few cases in which errors of judgment may occur do not
provide a sound basis, in my opinion, for scrapping the process.
* * *
Canada, Hon. Justice Pomerance: No, though the answer likely
varies across Canadian jurisdictions.
* * *
England and Wales, Professor McEwan: The U.K. cannot afford
to! It is inevitable when the law has ladders of offenses of varying
degrees of seriousness. Or as a cynic would say, if the cricket is on
at Lords....
* * *
New Zealand, Hon. Judge Harvey: As I have indicated, I do not
think it is practical now to do away with sentence indications. I
think they are part of the fabric of the criminal justice process val-
idated by legislation and they are here to stay.
* * *
United States, Ms. Brook: Although eliminating plea bargains
has been suggested as a possible solution to the problems I mention
above, I do not think it would be possible in the current environ-
ment. Even Michelle Alexander writes:
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After years as a civil rights lawyer, I rarely find myself
speechless. But some questions a woman I know posed during a
phone conversation one recent evening gave me pause: What
would happen if we organized thousands, even hundreds of
thousands, of people charged with crimes to refuse to play the
game, to refuse to plea out? What if they all insisted on their
Sixth Amendment right to trial? Couldnt we bring the whole
system to a halt just like that?323
In response to this question, Alexander explained the risks to folks
who exercise their right to trial in light of the current crush of harsh
mandatory minimum sentences and three-strikes laws that shift so
much power from judges to prosecutors.324
Nonetheless the caller persisted. Can we crash the system just
by exercising our rights?325 Yes, Alexander answered, we could.326
It would create a constitutional crisis and force much needed chang-
es.327 But, she wondered, could she actually urge others to take the
risk?328
And therein lies the rub. Because criminal defense attorneys owe
their undivided allegiance to the individual client they are repre-
senting and must give that client their best advice based on the
clients desires and their understanding of the case and the law, it
is impossible to imagine a scenario in which it would be in every
clients best interest to demand a trial.
CONCLUSION
In each of the five nations we looked at in this Article, nontrial
dispositionswhether called plea bargaining, resolution discus-
sions, or sentence indicationsoccur in many, if not most criminal
prosecutions. The somewhat dubious leader appears to be the
323. Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2012, at SR5.
324. See id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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United States, but we were struck by how little current and useful
data we could find in a few of the countries such as New Zealand
and England. The approaches we observed differed greatly. In the
United States, judges generally are strictly prohibited from being
involved in the negotiation process, whereas in Canada some
but by no means alljudges may be active participants. In New
Zealand, one sees a thoughtful and quite comprehensive statutory
oversight of plea bargaining, but in the other nationssee, for
instance, Australia and Canadathe practices have developed
without much statutory application over time, and may differ con-
siderably in various parts of the country.
In all five of the nations, the criminal trial is certainly not dead,
but serious concerns continue to be voiced as to the sheer volume of
negotiated pleas andin some of the countrieslimited oversight.
Moreover, a debate over this process has been active in each of the
nations in the academic sphere, but one is struck by how different
the public discourse has been in the various nations. In a few, it is
somewhat nonexistent, and in others, plea bargaining is widely
discussed from many points of view.
